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Michael Hatfield*
ABSTRACT
As artificial intelligence (AI) developers produce more applications for
professional use, how will we determine when the use is professionally
responsible? One way to answer the question is to determine whether the AI
augments the professional’s intelligence or whether it is used as a substitute
for it. To augment the professional’s intelligence would be to make it greater,
that is, to increase and improve the professional’s expertise. But a
professional who substitutes artificial intelligence for his or her own puts
both the professional role and the client at risk. The problem is developing
guidance that encourages professionals to use AI when it can reliably
improve expertise but discourages substitution that undermines expertise.
This Article proposes a solution, using tax professionals as a case study.
There are several reasons tax professionals provide a good case study,
including that tax practice has a long history of computerization and that AI
is already being developed for tax professionals. Tax professionals, including
not only lawyers but certified public accountants, are directly regulated by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in addition to their regulation by
professional bodies.
This Article proposes a public-private cooperation in regulating the use
of AI by professionals in ex ante tax planning. On the private side would be
panels of experts testing new AI applications for reliability by running
experiments. The panels would certify AI products determined to be
substantively sound and designed to educate and engage the professional. On
the public side, the IRS would provide a presumptive defense to professional
responsibility-related penalties against professionals who used the certified
AI. This should motivate tax planners to prefer purchasing certified tax
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planning AI applications, and thereby motivate tax AI application developers
to seek certification.
Though this Article’s proposal is specific for the use of AI by tax
professionals, it illuminates a way forward for regulating AI use by other
professions. The way would be for third parties such as government agencies,
professional associations, or malpractice insurers to stimulate demand for
certified AI products to be used by professionals. In general, these
certifications should be provided to AI that augments the professional’s
intelligence, increasing his or her professional competence. By keeping
professionals involved in the certification process, space is opened to shape
the transformation AI is bringing to the professions, and by stimulating
product demand for certified products, the odds of successfully shaping that
transformation are improved.
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Our goal is augmenting intelligence. It is man and machine. This
is all about extending your expertise. A teacher. A doctor. A
lawyer. It doesn’t matter what you do. We will extend it.
IBM President and Chief Executive Officer Ginni Rometty
speaking about IBM’s Watson1

I.

INTRODUCTION

A young mother visited her obstetrician, hoping for help losing weight.
Her doctor turned to a computer program to determine what should be
prescribed. The prescription killed the mother. Is this a case of professional
irresponsibility? Or is it a case of product liability? Who is at fault: the doctor
or the program developers? The New Jersey courts are deciding.2
Life-and-death situations magnify the risks of computer use so that we
easily take interest. But the rewards of doctors using computers should be
magnified as well so that we can see the bigger picture. Artificial intelligence
(AI) helps doctors diagnose and treat diseases; indeed, AI is so good at
detecting facts not noted by human professionals that it can successfully
predict the occurrence of disease in patients–remarkably, including diseases
that human professionals cannot predict and do not understand how AI
predicts.3 The quality of AI judgments in these situations exceeds that of the
professionals.
Judgment is the heart of professionalism. The professional has great
expertise, uncommon experience, and high duties of care to use that
intelligence in balancing risks and rewards when counseling patients or
clients. The professional knows more and is obligated to help the patient or
1.
IBM Think Ahead: Soon Watson AI Will Be Behind Every Decision, CYBER SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/ibm-think-aheadsoon-watson-ai-will-be-behind-every-decision-1830.html [https://perma.cc/4ZHN-NJ52].
2.
Skounakis v. Sotillo, No. A-2403-15T2, 2018 WL 1370216, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Mar. 19, 2018). See Charles A. Weiss, Malpractice by a Computerized Decision-Support
Tool?,
HOLLAND
&
KNIGHT
HEALTHCARE
BLOG
(April
2,
2018),
https://www.hklaw.com/healthblog/malpractice-by-a-computerized-decision-support-tool-0402-2018/ [https://perma.cc/4EFH-KJ6A].
3.
For example, a program called “Deep Patient” uses a massive amount of data to discern
patterns in order to predict when patients were likely to suffer from a variety of conditions. Will
Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [https://perma.
cc/E94Q-8SDB]. Neural networks are being used to interpret X-rays. Curtis E.A. Karnow, The
Opinion of Machines, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV 136, 147 (2017). Deep learning has also
proven better at detecting diabetic retinopathy better than their human ophthalmologist
counterparts. Sara Chodosh, Google Is Using Its Deep Learning Tech To Diagnose Disease,
POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.popsci.com/google-applied-technology-they-use-tosort-photos-to-diagnose-diabetic-eye-problems [https://perma.cc/8SA7-LJAN].
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client learn more about the problem and the variety of (usually imperfect)
solutions.
The ethical issue for a professional relying on a powerful computer
application is whether it is being used to augment the professional’s
intelligence, as IBM President and Chief Executive Officer Ginni Rometty
said about her corporation’s AI programs, or it is being used as a substitute
for the professional’s intelligence. To augment the professional’s intelligence
would be to make it greater, that is, to increase and improve the professional’s
expertise. But a professional who over-relies on AI, who always defers and
does not second-guess, substitutes artificial intelligence for his or her own.
The problem is how to develop guidance that encourages professionals to
use AI when it can reliably improve their expertise but discourages overreliance that risks their role as a professional and puts others at even more
serious risks. This Article proposes a solution.
The case study of this Article is tax law. There are several reasons the
practice of tax law makes a good case study. First, it involves a clear public
good: the funding of government. Tax professionals’ duties run both to the
client and to the public.4
Second, tax practice has a long history of computerization, and
considerable parts of the practice are already wholly computerized.5
Researchers continue to pursue greater applications, and with the amount of
money at stake in taxation, it is reasonable to predict the resources and
incentives will help deliver advanced AI to tax professionals sooner rather
than later.6
Third, the practice of federal tax law is interdisciplinary. No single
profession monopolizes it.7 Several professions share the expertise and
privileges of practice at all levels.8 Each profession has its own greater
4.
This is usually described as a duty to “the system” and to the client. See, e.g., BERNARD
WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 101.2 at 3
(5th ed. 1999); LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX PRACTICE 1 (2nd ed.
2016). Professor Deborah Schenk claims the self-reporting nature of the tax system means that
the tax system cannot permit the “absolute adversarial” relationship that lawyers might have in
other situations. Deborah H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 2005 (1982) (reviewing
BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE
(1981)).
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 55–81.
6.
See infra text accompanying notes 88–93.
7.
Attorneys, certified public accountants (CPAs), enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and
enrolled retirement plan agents may all represent clients in some capacity in front of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2019). As discussed below, this includes providing
written tax advice but, surprisingly to some, does not include preparing tax returns. See infra text
accompanying notes 94–100.
8.
Non-attorneys (such as CPAs) who pass an examination will be admitted to practice
before the Tax Court. TAX CT R. 200(a)(3) (2012).
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specialization, but they share the practice and routinely work together and
rely on one another.9 Often the investigation of AI ethics in the practice of
law devolves into fruitless argument as to where the practice of law ends and
the unauthorized practice of law begins.10 But, as the practice of federal tax
law is not limited to lawyers, defining the practice of law is not a distraction.
Fourth, there is a single and overarching regulator of tax professionals: the
federal government.11 It has the power to impose financial and criminal
penalties, and the power to disqualify someone from practice.12 It has unique
force in professional regulation.13
Fifth, the body of rules and standards for regulating tax professionals is
detailed and technical. This allows discussing the professional use of AI in a
precise and practical way.14 It prevents substituting a discussion of the
essence of human intelligence or the coming age of our robot overlords for a
discussion of professional ethics.15
The greatest potential for AI development is customized business tax
planning. This is the ex ante work of tax professionals. It is advising clients
on creating events so as to achieve the client’s non-tax goals in tax efficient
ways. In contrast is the work of reporting completed events to the government
9.
The National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants has recognized
both professions as qualified but have articulated principles that roughly divide the work. NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND CPAS, LAWYERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS: A
STUDY OF INTERPROFESSIONAL RELATIONS 5–10 (1981). The Conference recognizes that both
lawyers and CPAs are qualified to determine the probable tax effects of a transactions, but CPAs
are encouraged to consult lawyers as to the interpretation or application of laws, and lawyers are
encouraged to consults with CPAs as to describing the transaction in money terms or interpreting
financial results. Id. at 15. Preparing legal documents is the special expertise of lawyers while
preparing financial statements and similar reports is the special expertise of CPAs. Id. While both
lawyers and CPAs are entitled to represent clients in Tax Court, the Conference advises CPAs to
consult with lawyers when doing so. Id. at 16.
10. The practice of law is surprisingly difficult to define. Not surprisingly, the current
approach to unauthorized practice of law (UPL) rules is not very useful in policing the use of
computerized applications in this area. Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers?
Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 Gᴇᴏ. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 542 (2017).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 181–91.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 181–91.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 181–91.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 229–43.
15. My colleague Ryan Calo wrote, “Some set of readers may feel I have left out a key
question: does artificial intelligence present an existential threat to humanity? If so, perhaps all
other discussions constitute the policy equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Why
fix the human world if AI is going to end it?” Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer
and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 431 (2017). As Calo has pointed out, focusing on the
more remote risks distracts us from the more immediate ones. I do accept there is some chance
that AI will end the human world. But I know there is a much greater chance that doctors will kill
patients through the irresponsible use of AI long before it poses a risk to the entire world.
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and the work resolving controversies with the government. The ex post
reporting (i.e., completing and filing forms) has long been computerized (e.g.,
TurboTax), as the tax controversy resolution work has long been practically
dependent on computerized assistance (e.g., Westlaw and LexisNexis).
Highly customized tax planning as such, however, is the field with the highest
harvest potential for computerization.
In tax planning, the events have yet to occur, and the professional’s advice
is both creative and predictive. It creates the blueprint for events. It is
predictive as to the client’s prevailing if a controversy arises after the events
are completed and reported to the government. The potential is AI gathering
detailed facts on the client’s operations and goals, and perhaps even to
continuously gather operating facts in real time, and then detecting patterns
that are legally relevant and patterns that provide planning opportunities,
even though those patterns may not have been spotted by the professional.
This would mimic the human advisor’s role in tax planning: detecting the
relevant facts and laws, making appropriate assumptions and estimations,
applying the law, inferring opportunities, and assessing the risks. The product
in aim would be a well-tailored, legally sustainable tax plan with risks and
rewards well explained. What this Article considers is the professional
responsibility of tax professionals using what is, in some sense, their
technological substitute and that, in some cases, might perform not only as
well as but better.
This Article divides its discussion of the professional ethics of AI use by
tax professionals as follows. The first Part introduces the public importance
of tax and brings the reader up to date on AI in the practice of law generally
and the history of computer use in tax law specifically. The second Part
explains who tax professionals are and what they do and then describes the
potential use of AI for ex ante business tax planning. Part three explores the
professional responsibility concerns for professionals using tax planning AI
and then relates how specific professional responsibility standards illuminate
the way forward for encouraging professionally appropriate AI use. The
fourth Part proposes a public–private cooperation to encourage tax
professionals to use AI that can reliably improve their understanding but
discourage substituting AI for their own. This involves the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) providing defenses to penalties and professional sanctions for
professionals that use certified AI (but make mistakes), thereby creating
product demand for the certification. It is proposed that the IRS would
authorize panels of private experts to certify tax planning AI, including
certifying that the AI functions so as to improve the professional’s
understanding. The Article concludes with a reflection on how this specific
solution can illuminate the way for other professions to encourage the
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development and use of AI that improves professional intelligence rather than
undermining the profession with substitutions for intelligence.
II.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND
TAX
A. AI and the Legal Profession

Defining AI is difficult.16 And, unlike Justice Potter Stewart’s view of
illegal obscenity, we probably do not know it when we see it.17 We so quickly
adapt to technological innovations that we quickly forget how marvelous an
innovation first seemed and keep looking for something more marvelous to
come. Our twentieth-century ancestors would marvel at machines that

16. Merriam-Webster defines AI as “the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human
behavior.”
Artificial
Intelligence,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence [https://perma.cc/UE7A-UJZB] (last visited
Oct. 20, 2019). Dictionary.com defines it as “the capacity of a computer to perform operations
analogous to learning and decision making in humans.” Artificial Intelligence, DICTIONARY.ᴄᴏᴍ,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/artificial-intelligence?s=t [https://perma.cc/REQ4-SESS]
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019). Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary defines AI as “[t]he theory and
development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.”
Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/artificial_intelligence [https://perma.cc/33T2-G52T] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
Amazon, Inc. has propounded their own definition of AI as “the field of computer science
dedicated to solving cognitive problems commonly associated with human intelligence, such as
learning, problem solving, and pattern recognition.” What is Artificial Intelligence?, AMAZON
WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/what-is-ai/ [https://perma.cc/332692WC] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). According to one scholar: “AI is best understood as a set of
techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.”
Calo, supra note 15, at 403. According to another scholar: AI “refers to machines that are capable
of performing tasks that, if performed by a human, would be said to require intelligence.”
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, And Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & Tᴇᴄʜ. 353, 362 (2016).
17. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I have
reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative implication in the Court's
decisions since Roth and Alberts, that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws
in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further
to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.”).
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recognize faces18 and voices,19 speak and translate multiple languages,20
diagnose diseases,21 invest fortunes,22 suggest to us books23 and friends,24 play
and beat us at games,25 tell us where we are and how to get to where we should

18. Facebook has been sued for its use of facial recognition technology. Patel v. Facebook
Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2018). See also Karnow, supra note 3, at 146–47 (AI trained
itself to recognize cats by examining thousands of images and finding the commonalities). There
have however been some serious issues in facial recognition technology. For example, photos of
African Americans have identified as photos of gorillas rather than people. Jessica Guynn, Google
Photos Labelled Black People “Gorillas,” USA TODAY (July 1, 2015, 1:15 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/07/01/google-apologizes-after-photos-identifyblack-people-as-gorillas/29567465/ [https://perma.cc/93U7-3X85]. For a discussion of this and
related problems, see Calo, supra note 15, at 411.
19. Digital assistants, such as Alexa, are helping drive voice recognition technology and
represent possible avenues for increasing office efficiency in the future. Gordon K. Eng, The
Potential of New Digital Assistants for Office Use, 40 L.A. LAW. 34, 34 (2017).
20. Google Translate uses a deep neural network to discern “patterns of patterns” to make
probabilistic translations rather than its old method of phrase-based translation. Alexandra
Johnson, Don’t Get Lost in Translation: How Google Translate and Other AI Tools Are
Transforming Trademark Law, ACC DOCKET, September 2017, at 74, 76 (quoting Gideon
Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html
[https://perma.cc/E3SE-EFXV]).
21. Deep Patient uses a massive amount of data to discern patterns in order to predict when
patients were likely to be suffer from a variety of conditions. Knight, supra note 3, at 148.
22. The “robo-advice” market has expanded rapidly and can lower the cost of such services
dramatically. Megan Ji, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisors Under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2017).
23. Amazon has a relatively simple system that recommends books based on your past
purchases. Daniel M. Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned To Stop Worrying
and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J.
909, 954 (2013). The same sort of inductive reasoning is used for recommending music through
Pandora or shows/films through Netflix. Id. Meanwhile, LIBRA recommends books by content
based on information gleaned from the web used to create a user profile. F.O. Isinkayea, Y.O.
Folajimib, & B.A. Ojokohc, Recommendation Systems: Principles, Methods and Evaluation, 16
EGYPTIAN INFORMATICS J. 261, 265 (2015).
24. Gizmodo has created a tool which elucidates the cryptic “People You May Know”
feature of Facebook. Kashmir Hill & Surya Mattu, Keep Track of Who Facebook Thinks You
Know with This Nifty Tool, GIZMODO (Jan. 10, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://gizmodo.com/keeptrack-of-who-facebook-thinks-you-know-with-this-ni-1819422352
[https://perma.cc/XSH3XMD2].
25. By 1997, Deep Blue had beaten the world’s top human chess player. Peter Tillers,
Introduction: A Personal Perspective on “Artificial Intelligence and Judicial Proof,” 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2001). By 2016, AI had achieved what was once thought
impossible. AlphaGo defeated the world’s top human Go player. Karnow, supra note 3, at 137.
Watson has wiped the floor with many a contestant on Jeopardy! even without access to the
internet. Katz, supra note 23, at 926–27.
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be,26 and not only answer most of our daily questions but tell us which
question we are asking and correct our spelling when it does so.27 But this all
strikes us now as routine and unremarkable.
As with AI outside of professional lives, professionals become so quickly
accustomed to relying on technological innovations, we cease noticing.
Consider how habituated lawyers are to computer applications sorting
through thousands of case decisions and identifying the ones most relevant.
Imagine how impressed Justice Potter Stewart would be with today’s
Westlaw or LexisNexis.28 Consider how law firm associates from two
decades ago would react to the extent to which law firms today can use AI
rather than associates to review documents.29 Lawyers today can use AI for

26. GPS technology has the power to guide us where we want to go but also creates issues
for those who would rather remain undetected. See Tim Kolesk, At the Intersection of Fourth and
Sixth: GPS Evidence and the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1299, 1324–26 (2017).
27. Apple’s integration of autocorrect and suggestive words into its iPhones uses trained
pattern recognitions to correct our mistakes or save valuable moments in typing. Calo, supra note
15, at 407. The Google search bar has mastered the art of spell check and exemplifies the benefit
of machine intelligence: by cataloguing each instance that users search for phrases and words, the
system can now single out and predict commonly misspelled words. Katz, supra note 23, at 923–
24.
28. Lexis was designed to fulfill the Ohio Bar Association’s desire to create an electronic
database for searching through opinions. See John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great
Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of
Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3048 (2014). Westlaw followed soon after. Id.
Though both of these platforms were initially hamstrung by a lack of available opinions and a
lack of the ability to search the full text of opinions, these issues were addressed over time and
both are now virtually indispensable to modern legal research. Id.
29. With the rapid expansion of electronically stored information in the 1990s, a need for
computerized search led to early attempts at navigating the huge volume of information. Remus
& Levy, supra note 10, at 515. Initially the keyword focused search methods were far too over or
under inclusive to solve the issue because often content and specific meanings did not correlate
with the search terms. Id. It was not until predictive coding methods were used that the practice
gained widespread acceptance. Id. at 515–16. “Predictive coding” initially entailed a supervising
lawyer reviewing a sample set of documents and then classifying them as responsive or not. Id.
They would then have the software review the training sample in order to estimate a learning
model. It would then apply this model to the rest of the documents for relevancy. Id. After a
federal court approved of predictive coding as a method of dealing with discovery, the practice
expanded and more variations came into use. Id. at 516. Currently the most effective protocol sees
a supervising attorney starting with a keyword search to identify possibly relevant documents. Id.
They then rank these documents in order of relevancy. Id. This subset is then used to create a
statistical model to predict responsiveness. Id. This sophisticated method has been shown to often
be more accurate and timely than human lawyers. Id. The end result is that the demand for human
lawyers in document review is on the decline. Id. See also Harry Surden, Machine Learning and
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88–91 (2014).
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contract review,30 predicting what judges or opposing counsel will do,31 and
even identifying which lateral applicants should be hired.32 A few decades
from now, there may be few lawyers who remember what it was like to
review contracts, ponder opposing counsel’s next move, or even review
resumes, much like today there are few lawyers who know how to research
the law using books. Still, no doubt, those lawyers of the future will be
anticipating the technological innovations that will lighten their professional
load.
There is significant literature about AI and the law written by scholars,
lawyers, and journalists. One strand of this literature is focused on predicting
the impact of AI on the legal profession itself. How will it affect employment

30. “Machine learning” has been integral to the uptick in performance in AI. “Machine
learning refers to a subfield of computer science concerned with computer programs that are able
to learn from experience and thus improve their performance over time.” Surden, supra note 29,
at 89. This improvement in performance and recognition may be colloquially referred to as
“learning.” Id. at 95. Diligen uses machine learning and automated intelligence to sort and
summarize contracts while flagging important provisions. Diligen, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 47
(special supplement). Apttus uses machine learning to build pattern recognition on the fly, which
enables real-time decision-making when reviewing contracts. Apttus, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at
35 (special supplement). The AI builds its library to provide alternative provisions that are the
most likely to be used. Id. LawGeex provides a contract review framework where the program
uses a “playbook” set up as a firm would give an attorney. Lawgeex, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 53
(special supplement). The playbook is set up so that the program knows items they always want
to see, some they will not accept, and others which are largely irrelevant to their concerns. Id. The
AI then uses this playbook to test contracts and if it should be approved based on the criteria they
set forth; an email will be generated which tells them they can approve the contract. Id.
31. Docket Alarm “create[s] a statistical model of the ways that judges and courts decide
cases” by discerning patterns and developing predictive analytics from millions of court and
agency documents. Docket Alarm, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 47 (special supplement). Gavelytics
uses natural language and guided machine learning to evaluate state court documents and provide
metrics about trial court judge behavior, including judicial speed, by providing a “gavel score.”
Gavelytics, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 49 (special supplement).
32. Alphaserve gives law firms a brief introductory workshop to demonstrate the potential
of AI in a variety of in-house uses. Alphaserve, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 2018, at 36 (special supplement).
For example, Alphaserve can provide systematic resume review to help firms decide which lateral
associates they should hire in the place of summer and first-year associates. Id.
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of lawyers?33 How will the practice of law change?34 Is there some category
of lawyer tasks that can never be computerized?35 Closely related is the
literature addressing how AI may affect the delivery of legal services and

33. Some scholars believe the logical end point is a “post-professional” society where
lawyers are all but entirely displaced. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE
FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN
EXPERTS (2015); Jennifer Miller, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform
the Work of Human Experts by Richard Susskin and Daniel Susskin, LSE REV. OF BOOKS (2016)
(book review), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2016/02/02/book-review-the-future-ofthe-professions-how-technology-will-transform-the-work-of-human-experts-by-richard-anddaniel-susskind/ [https://perma.cc/74Q3-4A69]. Others have taken a more moderate and
data-driven approach and argued that some areas of law, such as document review, will be
seriously affected while other areas, such as legal writing, do not face such serious AI disruption
in the near future. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 515, 519; Tanina Rostain, Robots Versus
Lawyers: A User-Centered Approach, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 559, 563 (2017). It seems
inevitable that software with predictive coding technology will strongly affect the future of
discovery practice because it consistently achieves higher rates of recall and precision in
document review than human lawyers. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 515–16. It is not entirely
clear that the conventional wisdom that junior lawyers will see a larger impact than partners
actually bears out when examining the data. Id. at 532.
34. There is some scholarship which suggests that the extensive use of AI in discovery will
lead to parties focusing on developing unanticipated contingencies and using the time saved by
using AI to devote to other activities. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 541. For years, lawyers
have used software programs for document storage and shared document access. Id. at 513. Now,
software aids lawyers with templating, billing, account management, and document review. Id.
AI has the potential for practical use in the courtroom to determine the admissibility of computergenerated evidence. Karnow, supra note 3, at 163–65. A computer can be programmed to learn
and assess in the same way that a judge assesses the facts, in light of variant circumstances (or
degrees of truth), and then present a result with a level of certainty. Id. at 144–45. It has been
predicted that in the near future nearly all first drafts of most transactional documents will be
drafted by AI. McGinnis & Russell, supra note 28, at 3051. In the future, AI may create evidence
which may be used in the court, for example, to identify a suspect using facial recognition
technology in which no human could come to a definitive conclusion. Karnow, supra note 3, at
140.
35. “There are certain tasks that appear to require intelligence because when humans
perform them, they implicate higher-order cognitive skills such as reasoning, comprehension,
meta-cognition, or contextual perception of abstract concepts.” Surden, supra note 29, at 95.
Some such tasks are likely safe from imminent computerization. It has been suggested that tasks
requiring unstructured communication are still a long way off from being within the realm of AI
competence. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 537–38. For example, reasoning, which involves
common sense, is unavailable to AI until it has been programmed to do so because it involves
assumptions which will not be gleaned by analyzing and comparing documents. Id. These
assumptions need to be programmed into the AI before it would be able to understand the
underlying assumptions. Id. Brief writing, for example, often contains this sort of unstructured
communication. Id. Further, where there are contingencies present that are markedly different
from the model estimated by the machine, the AI will have difficulty processing in the face of
such difference. Id.
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justice.36 A third type of writings addresses how substantive areas of the law,
such as evidence, need to be adapted to accommodate the use of AI.37 A fourth
collection of scholarship directly addresses legal ethics issues. The duty to be
familiar with emerging technologies38 and whether the developers of such

36. AI has the potential to help clients with unmet legal needs. For example, LegalZoom,
Rocket Lawyer, and other for-profit ventures are developing automated web-based processes in
straightforward areas of the law to offer customized legal documents for less. Rostain, supra note
33, at 570. Other programs offer a range of legal help including a game that helps pro se litigants
prepare for a court appearance and apps that deliver information on legal rights in different
contexts. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 552 n. 206; John Biggs, HelpSelf Uses Simple AI To
Help Those in Legal Trouble, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2018, 7:10 AM)
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/12/helpself-uses-simple-ai-to-help-those-in-legal-trouble/
[https://perma.cc/UPJ6-5TCM] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
37. For example, AI could assign different degrees of certainty and uncertainty to various
inputs and then churn out a result with a corresponding level of certainty. Karnow, supra note 3,
at 163–65. This process would also produce decision trees which would show the importance of
factors on the various decisions made. Id. Experts would then provide to the judge, to determine
admissibility, and the jury, to determine weight, a step-by-step analysis of how the program
works, state the assumptions and underlying scientific theories, and explain the logic used to
arrive at the results. Id. Karnow also recognizes that there must be a different standard for the use
of AI in generating admissible evidence than there is for AI’s use in society at large. Id. at 177.
Karnow draws a red line in the use of unvalidated software which, while used all the time in the
world, “has no place in court.” Id.
38. In 2012, the American Bar Association (ABA) modified Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 to say
that a lawyer should stay abreast of changes in relevant technology. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012). The ABA has thus pointed out the importance of
technology in the field. Though very vague in its direction, this was by design in order to ensure
that the lawyer’s skill changes with each new iteration of technology. Further, it is not possible to
know what advances will come in the future that would challenge a more specific set of duties.
See Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First Century Lawyer’s Evolving Ethical Duty of Competence,
22 PROF. LAW., 24, 25 (2014). Despite the vague instructions, the majority of state bars to date
have adopted the commentary. Robert Ambrogi, Tech Competence, LAWSITES
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence [https://perma.cc/6KWC-ZWKV] (last visited
Oct. 20, 2019). Thus far, the duty has mainly been applied to storage of electronic data, social
media, discovery, and the cloud. Jamie J. Baker, Beyond the Information Age: The Duty of
Technology Competence in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S.C. L. REV. 557, 557–58 (2018).
Algorithms have been noticeably absent. Id.
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may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL)39 are the two most
commonly discussed issues.40
What has yet to be addressed is the extent to which it is (or will be)
professionally appropriate for a lawyer to rely on AI. To return to the initial
story above, in what circumstances would it have been appropriate for the
obstetrician to rely on the computer program when prescribing medications?41
Though it may not occur to us at first, we might also ask, in what
circumstances would it have been appropriate to rely on Internet searches
rather than personal knowledge or physically published drug manuals rather
than personal knowledge to prescribe?
How deeply should technological innovations be scrutinized to determine
their reliability for professional use? Lawyers have long relied on commercial
publishers of statutes and cases with little anxiety that the texts might
incorporate publishers’ mistakes.42 And despite the well-documented
different search results yielded in different databases by the same research
query, no one has alleged it is professionally inappropriate to rely on only

39. It has been suggested that the current approach to UPL rules is not very useful in policing
this area. Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 542. For starters, judges have to make normative
judgments about whether a given program is closer to a legal services provider or a scrivener
because the rules are applied to people in the same way as they are programs which does not
reflect the true state of affairs. Id. There are also tasks which AI may be better suited at in a
particular context but which may not extend to every other context. Id. at 543. Therefore, treating
them the same as a person may not be the most efficient approach in determining whether there
was a UPL violation. Id. Nevertheless, regulation is necessary to avoid unintended consequences
which would likely largely fall on the poorest users of such legal technologies. Id. at 544–45.
40. Of course, legal ethics scholars have considered other digital technology issues, such as
the duty to provide cybersecurity for client information. See Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next
Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 501 (2016); Natasha Babazadeh, Legal
Ethics and Cybersecurity: Managing Client Confidentiality in the Digital Age, 7 J.L. & CYBER
WARFARE 85 (2018). The issue of being paid in cryptocurrency is also a topic increasing in
relevancy. See Lisa Miller, Getting Paid in Bitcoin: Attorneys Accepting Cryptocurrency as
Payment Should Be Sensitive to the Fact That the Regulatory Landscape Is Likely To Change in
the Near Future, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2018, at 19. The lack of regulatory specificity in its application
to algorithms has been noted as a particular blindspot. Baker, supra note 38, at 558.
41. Skounakis v. Sotillo, No. A-2403-15T2, 2018 WL 1370216, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Mar. 19, 2018).
42. Perhaps some anxiety is warranted. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Thomson Reuters Says
Glitch Left Out Text From 600 Cases Since 2014, LAWSITES (Apr. 16, 2016)
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2016/04/thomson-reuters-says-left-text-600-cases-since2014.html [https://perma.cc/3UC4-RN3T] (discussing the fact that Thompson Reuters Westlaw
had to send out an email to its clients informing them that over 600 cases had text missing due to
a conversion error). See generally Paul Hellyer, Evaluating Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite for
Case Validation Accuracy, 110 L. LIBR. J. 449 (2018) (discussing issues with the citators used by
Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law in identifying when cases have received negative treatment).
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one of those databases when researching the law.43 But these tools help the
lawyer develop her judgment on any given issue. Advanced AI, however, has
the potential to render judgment itself on professional issues.
The art of good judgment is the heart of professionalism. The emerging
risk is that a professional substitutes the judgment of AI for his or her own.
What makes the professional responsibility questions about emerging AI
particularly hard is that a judgment of AI may, in fact, be superior to that of
the professional’s. The belief that it is likely to be better is what would lure a
professional into substitution. Of course, this temptation would arise only
when the professional believed the computer knew better than he or she did,
but we can anticipate that those situations will be increasingly common as AI
develops. The concern then is that a lawyer may come to rely on the
judgments of AI in situations in which the lawyer’s own professional
understanding is too limited to judge the quality of the AI. In the long run,
this is a concern for the existence of the profession: if AI becomes sufficiently
impressive, non-lawyers may adequately handle the work once reserved for
lawyers and those who once were clients may run the AI programs
themselves.44 More practically, and more quickly, the concern will be
determining the line between professional reliance on AI and unprofessional
over-reliance on AI.
B. Tax: Money, Government, and Computer Science
Tax law is a good case study for the professional responsibility issues
related to AI. It is a professional area that seems quite likely to be leveraged
by AI sooner rather than later due to its political and financial importance and
due to its long history and current state of computerized assistance.
All governments need revenue to function, and in this is the unique
importance of tax law. Tax law sets forth terms on which a government has
the right to compel contributions for its purposes, and there is a long, at times

43. In comparing six different legal databases using data from 2015, the exact same inquiry
was used to compare each database. Susan Nevelow Mart, Results May Vary, 104 A.B.A. J. 48,
49 (2018). Only 7% of cases appeared in all of them, and over 40% of the overall cases were
unique to a particular database. Id. The author also found that more established databases (e.g.,
Lexis Advance and Westlaw) found more cases that were relevant and unique compared to other
databases even when limited to reported cases in one jurisdiction. Susan Nevelow Mart, Every
Algorithm Has a POV, 22 AALL SPECTRUM 40, 42 (2017). In looking at the relevance of the top
five search results in each database, only Lexis (64.4%) and Westlaw (77.6%) produced over 50%
relevant cases in the identical inquiries. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact:
Implications for Legal [Re]Search, 109 L. LIBR. J. 387, 414 (2017).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 28–34.
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bloody, history of disputes over these terms.45 The American War for
Independence was rooted in the claim that that it was “the undoubted rights
of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them” without their
consent or representation.46 This type of dispute between the taxing and the
taxed is not an Anglo-American peculiarity, of course: across time and
around the globe, citizens have violently demanded government respect
limits on compelling contributions.47 And in countless more commonplace
and less dramatic incidents the would-be taxed and the taxing authorities
conflict and resolve their conflicts on the amounts to be taken.48 In tax law,
the political relationship between government and citizen becomes most
practical. On the one hand, as Oliver Wendell Holmes explained it, taxpayers
should accept that taxes “are what we pay for civilized society.”49 But, on the
45. Arthur J. Cockfield & Jonah Mayles, The Influence of Historical Tax Law Developments
on Anglo-American Laws and Politics, 5 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 41, 57 (2013).
46. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 recognized the authority of Parliament (exclusive of
the Monarch) to levy taxes. Cockfield & Mayles, supra note 45, at 57. It was their claim of the
right to no taxation without representation that led to the First Congress of the American Colonies,
also known as the Stamp Act Congress, to make several resolutions. Id. at 58–59. The three key
resolutions were the third: “That it is inseparably essential to the Freedom of a People, and the
undoubted Right of Englishmen, that no Tax be imposed upon them, but with their own Consent,
given personally, or by their Representatives.” Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, October
19, 1765, reprinted in DAVID F. BURG, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 373 (2d ed. 2007). The
fourth: “That the People of these Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances, cannot be
represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain.” Id. And finally, the fifth: “That the only
Representatives of the People of these Colonies, are the Persons chosen therein by themselves;
and that no Taxes ever have been, or can be, constitutionally imposed on them but by their
respective Legislatures.” Id.
47. Several hundred tax rebellions from ancient times to the twenty-first century and in
places across the globe hundreds of tax protests, uprisings, rebellions, and revolutions are well
documented. See DAVID F. BURG, A WORLD HISTORY OF TAX REBELLIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF TAX REBELS, REVOLTS, AND RIOTS FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT, at vi (2004).
48. In fiscal year 2017, IRS Chief Counsel received 70,632 cases and closed 73,632 cases,
including some received in prior years. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 DATA BOOK 59 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304complete-report [https://perma.cc/K6KH-84CL]. There is a significant difference between what
the IRS considers audits in its reports and what may be deemed “unreal” audits which take into
account other forms of action that require taxpayers to give the IRS information, but which do not
technically constitute audits under the IRS definition in 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (West 2019).
Compare id. at 21, with 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (West 2019). Therefore, the National Taxpayer
Advocate’s position is that there are 9.1 million audits when combining “real” and “unreal” audits.
Ashlea Ebeling, IRS Official Audit Rate Down but the “Real” Audit Rate Is the Problem, FORBES
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2018/03/29/irs-official-audit-ratedown-but-the-real-audit-rate-is-the-problem/#7701047c1f92 [https://perma.cc/KN3C-W6J4].
49. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S.
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, O., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s holding that a state may not impose
a tax on contracts, or the money used to secure them, which are made and performed outside of
the state).
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other hand, as Learned Hand explained, the government must accept that any
taxpayer has the right to “so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low
as possible.”50 The professional duties of the tax professional inhere in
articulating both the government’s right to compel contribution and the
taxpayer’s right to contribute no more than necessary.51
There is also good reason to anticipate that tax law will be a field in which
substantial AI advances emerge sooner rather than later. Tax is, of course, the
place the money is: with 3.4 trillion dollars passing from private hands to
U.S. government coffers each year,52 both the government and taxpayers have
not only the financial interest but the financial resources to develop AI. The
demand for AI advances also can be measured in the number of taxpayers
and not just their dollars: more than two hundred million individuals file
income tax returns each year, and nearly eleven million business entities.53
Filing and processing these returns is one of the greatest undertakings of data
management on the planet each year. Tax compliance and administration, and
even ex ante tax planning, are, ultimately, tasks of collecting and analyzing
data.54 The tax field is tailored for help from AI advances, which is one reason
to anticipate its development.
50. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 (1916) (holding that in order to receive the
benefit of the law, a taxpayer must still conform to the purpose of the tax law which means more
than simply meeting statutory definitions contained within the law) (“We agree with the Board
and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any
one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s
taxes.”); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d. 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934) (citing U.S. v. Isham, 84 U.S.
496, 505 (1873)).
51. In tax parlance, a taxpayer arranging “his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible” is known as tax avoidance and is legitimate. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE
DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN
TAX
AVOIDANCE
AND
TAX
EVASION
https://apps.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/whys/thm01/les03/media/ws_ans_thm01_les03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M6P-4EKC]. What is illegitimate is not paying the tax rightly due; this is
known as tax evasion. Id.
52. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 11.
53. 204,405,851 for individuals (doubling the amount for married filing jointly and
surviving spouses), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 1304 at 48 (2018); 10,939,213
business entities in 2017, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 4.
54. Former IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said that what “really matters” to the IRS is
“the organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and intelligence we extract from the
information.” Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner
Doug Shulman to the Leaders & Legends Series, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School,
Baltimore
(May
18,
2011)
(https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-11-055.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/J8D2-EZ69]. Though the use of data analytics in the tax realm has been
primarily concerned with hindsight, there is a push to drive the applications further for predictive
and prescriptive uses to enable organizations to have a better understanding of likely tax burdens

1074

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Tax professionals have long thought the field ready for computerization.
By 1958, there were two committees of the Taxation Section of the American
Bar Association (ABA) that were tasked with exploring the use of computers
in the tax field.55 The tax bar was following the lead of the IRS. In 1955 the
IRS had begun testing computers for two different purposes: one, processing
returns, and two, analyzing data.56 As for processing returns, the IRS was
successful in its first experiment: over one million returns were processed this
way in 1955.57 In 1958, the IRS began installing computers in various centers
around the country.58 By 1965, all business return processing was
computerized, and, two years later, all returns nationwide were.59 By 1967,
the IRS had a computerized file on every taxpayer in the nation.60
As to analyzing statistics, the IRS early realized the value of what today is
called “Big Data.”61 This data was used to provide timely reports on income
and economic activity for the government.62 It also was used to determine the
best methods of collection, the most common causes of errors, and how the
IRS might better facilitate voluntary compliance.63 Very importantly, on the
basis of the data, the IRS developed a mathematical technique to select
returns for audit.64 This technique–the Discriminant Index Function (DIF)–
used algorithms developed by sampling returns to identify returns having a
high probability of error.65 To this day, the DIF score is used to determine

in normal operations and in hypothetical situations when they are weighing options as well as
using analytics to test for the potentiality of errors within a sample group. See Tax Data Analytics:
A New Era for Tax Planning and Compliance, DELOITTE 6 (2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-data-analytics-anew-era-for-tax-planning-and-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7T3-37P9]. Machine learning
can be used to build heuristics over time through inferences found in analyzing data patterning.
Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 91 (2014). This is easily
translated into the realm of tax law.
55. Report on the Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval, 86 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
669, 669 (1961).
56. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A
CHRONOLOGY 161 (1993) [hereinafter IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK].
57. These returns were Form 1040As filed in the Omaha Region. Id.
58. The IRS installed IBM 650 computers in the Northeast Service Center, the Kansas City
Service Center, and the Ogden Service Center. Id. at 164.
59. Sheldon S. Cohen, Automation and Tax Administration, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 69 (1967).
60. Id. at 70; Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner Caplin Reviews His Record as IRS Chief,
29 VA. TAX REV. 177, 178 (2009).
61. See Caplin, supra note 61, at 179.
62. Cohen, supra note 59, at 70.
63. Id. at 72.
64. Singleton B. Wolfe, The Use of Computers in Tax Administration, 17 JURIMETRICS J.
215, 215 (1977); IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK, supra note 56, at 191.
65. Id.
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whether the tax return should be given closer review.66 How this scoring
works is a closely guarded secret.67
While the IRS was focused on using algorithms for audit purposes, and
generally improving its processing of hundreds of millions of returns each
year, the emerging focus of tax professionals was using computers for
business tax planning. Beginning in 1971, a recent graduate of Harvard Law
School, L. Thorne McCarty combined his education in mathematics and
philosophy with his legal training as a Law and Computer Fellow at Stanford
Law School.68 With funding provided by the IBM Corporation and computers
provided by the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, McCarty began
experimenting with AI’s ability to assess the tax consequences of corporate
reorganization plans and, thereby, also to address fundamental and
philosophical issues about the nature of law and legal reasoning.69 His
experiment in the tax field caught the attention of others interested in
computerized legal reasoning.70 McCarty published his programming
techniques and his reflections on its potential and limitations in the Harvard
Law Review in 1977, predicting that a prototype useful for corporate tax
planning might be developed before the end of the 1980s.71
66. See infra note 107.
67. Michael B. Lang & Jay A. Soled, Disclosing Audit Risk to Taxpayers, 36 VA. TAX REV.
423, 432–33 (2017); See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
4.19.11.1.5.1(8)–(9) (Nov. 9, 2007) (explaining that “DIF mathematical formulas are confidential
in nature and are distributed to IRS personnel only on a need-to-know basis” and that “DIF
formulas are for official use only and will not be discussed with unauthorized personnel”). See 26
U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2019). See also Buckner v. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893, 898 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
(DIF scores are exempt from FOIA).
68. L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence
and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837, 837 n.* (1977).
69. Id. at 837 n.*, 839, 849.
70. See, e.g., PHILIP SLAYTON, RADICAL COMPUTER USE IN LAW 67–68 (drft. Report, June
1974); Hélène Bauer-Bernet & Ejan Mackaay, Effect of Information Science on the Formation
and Drafting of Law, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 248 n.14 (1974); William E. Boyd, Law in
Computers and Computers in Law: A Lawyer’s View of the State of the Art, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 267,
286–87 n.107 (1972); Walter G. Popp & Bernhard Schlink, JUDITH, A Computer Program to
Advise Lawyers in Reasoning a Case, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 303, 313–14 (1975); Philip Slayton,
Electronic Legal Retrieval, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 108 (1974) (prepared for the Canadian Department
of Communications).
71. McCarty, supra note 68, at 892. About the time this article was published, the use of
computers for word processing was only emerging. See David S. Dunkle, The ERISA: The
Attorney and the Computer, 17 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGT. 378 (1976) (touting a plan for ERISA,
a computerized document assembly services). The attorney need take no more than one hour to
select from the seven pages of options available, and then only another half hour reviewing the
final document when it was delivered. Id. at 380. The service had a “[n]ormal turnaround time”
of “ten to fifteen days,” though under special “prearranged conditions” the documents could be
available within forty-eight hours. Id. at 379. Within that context, McCarty’s prediction was
remarkably bold.
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Not long after McCarty published his article, Professor Robert Hellawell
of Columbia Law School published a similar article in the Columbia Law
Review.72 He considered McCarty’s technical methodology to be too
“ambitious,” and so set out to write a corporate tax planning program that
used a different methodology.73 The following year, Hellawell published his
efforts to computerize tax planning for U.S. taxpayers investing in foreign
mines.74 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the potential to computerize
tax planning continued to lure experts into the field.75 But no prototype useful
for tax planning emerged.76
But while tax planning was not transformed by computerization in the
1980s, as McCarty had hoped it might be, tax compliance was. Tax form
preparation software began emerging in the early 1980s.77 In 1982, Jackson
Hewitt Tax Services took a radical step in requiring its form preparers to use
software.78 By 1987, about 13% of paid preparers used software.79 The
forerunner of TurboTax was designed in 1983, and by 1990 earned $19
million in annual revenue, though well into the 1990s fewer than 10% of
72. See Robert Hellawell, A Computer Program for Legal Planning and Analysis: Taxation
of Stock Redemptions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1980).
73. Id. at 1365 n.5.
74. See Robert Hellawell, CHOOSE: A Computer Program for Legal Planning and
Analysis, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339 (1981) (for U.S. tax planning of foreign mining
investments).
75. See, e.g., Dean A. Schlobohm & L. Thorne McCarty, EPS II: Estate Planning with
Prototypes, PROC. OF THE 2D INT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND L. 1, 1–10 (1989)
(EPS II for U.S. testamentary tax planning); Kathryn E. Sanders, Representing and Reasoning
About Open-Textured Predicates, PROC. OF THE 3D INT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND L. 137, 137–44 (1991) (CHIRON system that structures real estate transactions to generate
most favorable tax consequences); David B. Skalak & Edwina L. Rissland, Arguments and Cases:
An Inevitable Intertwining, 1 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 3 (1992) (CABARET system for
U.S. home office tax deduction). In the 1980s, interest in computerized tax planning was also
gaining ground outside the U.S. See, e.g., J. R. Mace & P. F. Pope, Tax Planning and Computer
Simulation, 1980 BRIT. TAX REV. 45, 45 (1980).
76. Sanders, supra note 75.
77. Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443,
455 (2014). There were multiple news articles detailing the rise of such software. See, e.g., Don
Nunes, Computer Programs Aid Tax Return Preparation, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 1983),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1983/02/14/computer-programs-aid-taxreturn-preparation/e2f94291-4ef8-40b5-b900-22a0dd34d7c8/?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/XPF4-U2KH]; Ellen Benoit, The Tax Preparation Revolution, FORBES, Jan. 17,
1983, at 69. See also John W. Hazard, Doing Your Taxes by Computer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 19, 1984, at 86; William D. Marbach, Now, the Electronic Tax Man, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
19, 1984, at 106; David E. Sanger, Software for Doing Your Own Return, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1984, § 12, at 76.
78. Mock & Shurtz, supra note 77, at 456.
79. Jackson Hewitt helped pave the way for the fast growth by requiring all its preparers to
use tax software, which helped lead to the 13% figure by 1987. Id.
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individuals used return preparation software.80 Today, of course, virtually all
professional preparers use return preparation software,81 as do over one-third
of individual taxpayers.82 And the majority of the other individual taxpayers
use preparers who, of course, use return preparation software.83 The result is
that virtually all U.S. tax returns are prepared with computers.
While computerized tax form preparation is remarkable, it is not as
remarkable in terms of computerized legal reasoning as it may seem.84 As
Northwestern Law Professor Sarah Lawsky has pointed out: these programs
computerize tax forms—not tax law.85 As Lawsky explains it:
Tax forms are extraordinary in that they are designed so that people
who do not know or understand the law can still comply with the
law. Indeed, people may have absolutely no idea why they are
filling out certain lines, or what the legal implications of those lines
are. And yet they do fill out the forms, and they do thus comply with
the law.86

While the form preparation programs make it easier for taxpayers to
prepare their returns, the difficulties in computerizing legal reasoning are

80. Id. at 455–56.
81. Id. at 456.
82. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 5, 8, tbls.3 & 4.
83. Id.
84. Indeed, as popular as such programs are, there are shortcomings documented. See, e.g.,
Bryan Camp, Lesson for Tax Day: When Tax Prep Software Gets It Wrong, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr.
15, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/04/lesson-for-tax-day-when-tax-prepsoftware-gets-it-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/B2AW-2UK2] (discussing how he has had to
correct tax preparation software while doing his taxes); Tobie Stranger, Can You Trust Online
Do-It-Yourself Tax Prep? CR’s Evaluation Raises Questions, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.consumerreports.org/taxes/can-you-trust-online-do-it-yourself-tax-prep-crevaluation-raises-questions/ [https://perma.cc/D39K-54RN] (discussing several issues with the
most popular programs including mistakes regarding the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, using old tax
laws, and not discovering an input error that was intentionally made).
85. Professor Lawsky has worked with the MIT Lab to propose changes to the I.R.C. to help
AI grasp with the semantic difficulties inherent in the code. Marcos Pertierra, Sarah Lawsky, Erik
Hemberg & Una-May O’Reilly, Towards Formalizing Statute Law As Default Logic Through
Automatic Semantic Parsing, ASAIL 2017: 2nd Workshop on Automated Semantic Analysis of
Information in Legal Texts, 2017 (available at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/EVODesignOpt/groupWebSite/uploads/Site/ASAIL_2017_Pertierra.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/B95KZ5DT]. In her upcoming paper, she discusses the issue of software as computerizing forms rather
than the law. See Paul Caron, Lawsky Presents ‘Form As Formalization’ Today at Wayne State,
TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/01/lawskypresents-form-as-formalization-today-at-wayne-state.html [https://perma.cc/C9RE-FAWX].
86. Sarah B. Lawsky, Comment, Form As Formalization, J. OF L. AND POL’Y FOR THE INFO.
SOC’Y (forthcoming 2019); see also Caron, supra note 85.
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avoided by the form preparation program developers: the developers merely
follow the lead of the form’s instructions.87
There has yet to be developed a computerized application that would
transform professional tax planning in the sense of a program that proposes
customized tax solutions. That is, computerized applications for the ex ante,
creative, predictive professional work focused on the unique situation and
aspiration of a taxpayer. That is not to say that there have not been significant
innovations. Not only has tax research benefitted from the same types of
advances all legal research has, but one of the first legal field-specific uses of
IBM’s AI program, Watson, was tax.88 There are also programs to guide tax
professionals to determine the most tax advantageous choice in routine
situations.89 While we can easily imagine programs that would do more, we
should notice how far into the process we are by noting how bedazzled our
twentieth-century professional ancestors would be by what is already
commonplace in tax practice.
Both scholars and tax professionals are at work on further advancing the
computerization of the tax field. For example, Lawsky’s research into the
logic of the tax code and the potential for Congressional formalization of
statutes continues the foundational, conceptual, and philosophical work that
first appeared in the 1970s and 1980s.90 Computer scientists continue to

87. Lawsky, supra note 86.
88. Blue J was founded by law faculty at the University of Toronto in 2015 after one
member was inspired while judging an IBM Watson competition. While initially focused on tax
law in Canada, the company has since branched out into employment law and seeks to expand
into other areas of U.S. law. Chris Sorensen, U of T startup Blue J Legal raises US$7 million,
plans cross-border expansion, U OF T NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.utoronto.ca/news/u-tstartup-blue-j-legal-raises-us7-million-plans-cross-border-expansion [https://perma.cc/R6WVSWHU]. Blue J uses AI to predict the outcome of tax cases by essentially conducting an interview
and comparing the facts to previous cases and outputs a legal memo. The National Law Journal
2018 Ai Leaders, NAT’L L. J. 33, 39 (2018).
89. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG INCOME TAX PLANNER, https://www.bna.com/bna-income-taxp17179917939/ [https://perma.cc/LXK9-KYZ3]; CCH PROSYSTEM FX PLANNING,
https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professional-tax-software/prosystem-fx/planning
[https://perma.cc/7XF9-RBF5];
THOMSON
REUTERS
PLANNER
CS,
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/us/en/cs-professional-suite/planner-cs [https://perma.cc/E6WZQU2K].
90. See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60 (2018)
(arguing for an alternative understanding of rule-based legal reasoning in some contexts which
abandons formal logic following from deductive reasoning in favor of default logic using
defeasible reasoning); Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377 (2017)
(arguing that lawmakers should more thoroughly address definitional scope in the I.R.C. by
logically defining terms in order to alleviate problems in interpreting statutes and help lay the
groundwork for AI to more fully develop an understanding of the Code); Pertierra, Lawsky,
Hemberg & O’Reilly supra note 85.
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pursue topics in AI and taxation.91 And the world’s “Big 4” accounting firms
tout their AI and related consulting services.92 The confluence of advances in
this research and the commercialization of expertise occurring in a wellfinanced field that is already substantially penetrated by computerization
make tax a very interesting—and perhaps uniquely interesting—AI horizon.93
III.

AI AND TAX PROFESSIONALS

A. Planning, Compliance, Audit, and Litigation
To view the AI horizon in tax practice, one must see what the practice of
tax law is and who is involved. The practice of tax law involves four types of
services, which are provided by a half dozen types of practitioners: certified
public accountants (CPAs), lawyers, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries,
enrolled retirement plan agents, and tax return preparers.94 The four types of
services are planning, compliance, audit representation, and litigation.95
These services may be performed for all types of taxpayers and across all
91. For example, several computer scientists at the MIT Computer Science & Artificial
Intelligence Lab are working on the STEALTH (Simulating Tax Evasion And Law Through
Heuristics) project to apply AI to identify tax non-compliant partnership behavior. See THE
STEALTH PROJECT, http://stealth.csail.mit.edu/index.html [https://perma.cc/KFJ8-7XG5] (last
visited Sept. 21, 2019).
92. See
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
(AI),
DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/tags/artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/4USP-ZJAK] (last visited Sep. 5, 2019); ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
CONSULTING SERVICES, EY,
https://www.ey.com/en_gl/advisory/artificial-intelligenceconsulting-services [https://perma.cc/G2WF-SN4M] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019); ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE,
KPMG,
https://advisory.kpmg.us/services/data-analytics/artificialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/B4C6-3A95] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019); TAX ANALYTICS
AND DATA VISUALIZATION COURSES: PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/taxinnovation.html [https://perma.cc/5QYE-2SHF] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). On PwC, see also
Michael Cohn, Tax Professionals Expected To Use AI More in the Future,
ACCOUNTINGTODAY.COM (May 1, 2017), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/taxprofessionals-expected-to-use-ai-more-in-the-future [https://perma.cc/ZD4R-A6CU].
93. See Steven K. Rainey, Brad Brown & David B. Kirk, Bots, Natural Language
Processing,
and
Machine
Learning,
TAX EXECUTIVE
(Sept.
21,
2017),
http://taxexecutive.org/bots-natural-language-processing-and-machine-learning/
[https://perma.cc/8MHN-FHVJ] (discussing the impact of bots, natural language processing, and
machine learning on tax practice and arguing that the real power of cognitive computing is its
ability to ingest massive amounts of data).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 10.3(a)–(f) (2019). Even though tax return preparer registration is
contemplated by § 10.3(f), the IRS has been denied the authority to regulate return preparers in
these regulations. Loving v. IRS. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the IRS did not
have authority to promulgate the regulations). See also infra text accompanying notes 192–94.
95. Id.
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income levels: low-income individuals and multi-national corporations,
small business and large charities, and trusts and partnerships of all sizes and
purposes.96
Tax planning is developing ex ante strategies to accomplish business or
personal goals with the least tax costs.97 The tax plan is Learned Hand’s
taxpayer arranging his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible.98
Plans may range from the straightforward and uncontroversial, such as the
benefits of converting one type of retirement account into another,99 to
complicated and controversial tax shelter plans, which are aimed to lower tax
costs without regard to true economic costs or true business or personal
goals.100
96. According to the most recent statistics available from the IRS on income tax returns,
there were 150,690,787 individual returns, 2,050,182 C or other corporation returns, 4,842,706 S
corporation returns, 4,046,325 partnership returns, and 2,994,547 trust and estate returns filed in
fiscal year 2017. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 48, at 15–17, tbl.3.
97. Tax planning is designing transactions that “lessen tax liability and maximize after-tax
income” when compared to alternatives. WORKSHEET: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAX
AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION, https://apps.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/whys/thm01/les03/
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF3B-PCKZ] (last visited Sep. 5, 2019). Tax avoidance is the minimization
of taxes; the evasion of taxes is illegal. Id. The IRS offers a publication on the differences between
the two. Id.
98. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934) (“We agree with the Board and
the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any
one [sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one’s taxes.”).
99. For example, it may be advisable to a client facing imminent death to convert an IRA to
a Roth IRA in order to facilitate tax exempt withdrawals by heirs later while using the immediate
tax consequences to offset income liability on the estate. John J. Scroggin, Income Tax Planning
for Clients with Shorter Life Expectancies, 92 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 197, 204 (2014).
100. “Tax shelters” are usually considered abusive. However, the technical definition
includes “any plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such . . . plan or arrangement is the
avoidance . . . of Federal income tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2019). This definition of
“tax shelter” technically seems to include legitimate tax planning, such as determining when it is
tax advantageous to convert an IRA into a Roth IRA. Separating an abusive “tax shelter” from a
non-abusive tax plan is notoriously difficult. Former IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz contrasted
abusive and non-abusive tax shelters. Michael Hatfield, Committee Opinions and Treasury
Regulation: Tax Lawyer Ethics, 1965-1985, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 675, 700 (2014). Non-abusive tax
shelters “admittedly reduced ‘the equity of the tax system by reducing the taxes . . . of upper
income taxpayers,’ but for non-abusive shelters, Congress had decided this was a ‘tolerable side
effect of a special tax provision’ to encourage particular investments.” Id. (quoting Jerome Kurtz,
Commissioner’s Remarks on Abusive Tax Shelter Issues, 55 TAXES - THE TAX MAG. 774, 774
(1977)). In contrast, “[a]busive tax shelters were the ones in which the loss of equity was not
offset by intended greater benefits and that, accordingly, decreased the fairness of and respect for
the tax system.” Id.
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Tax planning aims to create tax-advantageous transactions, while
compliance reports transactions after they occur.101 These reported
transactions may be as straightforward as compensation payments from
employers to employees,102 or cash donations by individuals to charities,103
or may be as complicated as corporate mergers and acquisitions.104 All
taxpayers report their tax relevant transactions to the IRS at least once a year,
though many taxpayers report more frequently.105

Historically, there has been a struggle to develop a consensus definition of tax shelters.
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 703 (2009). However, there is broad agreement
that they are carefully designed transactions to derive unintended benefits from the Code while
technically following the letter of the law. Id. at 699. There have been several difficulties in trying
to target tax shelters. Id. at 703–10. To begin with, tax laws are prospective in nature, which
means that even when targeted behavior is later regulated, the ill-gotten gains are left untouched.
Id. Even as Congress works to remedy the issues, new ones can arise with each fix and the more
time that passes allows more taxpayers to take advantage of the loophole. Id. After efforts to curb
the practice in the 70s and 80s, tax shelter structures became more and more complicated and
varied, which makes regulation more difficult in the first place. Id. To make matters worse, more
players entered the tax shelter game and the aggressiveness of positions increased, which further
makes regulation harder. Id. Because courts are not limited by retroactivity in the way lawmakers
are, they have played an important role in curbing tax shelters. Id. Courts utilize several tests to
determine whether the transaction fails as a tax shelter. Id. However, these have also proved
inadequate in dealing with the problem of tax shelters because there are issues of subjectivity and
the inability to address the target directly. Id.
101. With respect to compliance, the professional “takes ‘the facts as he finds them’ and
claims a position, functioning principally as an advocate.” See, e.g., Hatfield, supra note 100, at
694 n.151 (2014) (citing Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAX
LAW. 5, 37–38 (1980)).
102. As a sole proprietor filing for 2018, the amount paid as compensation to employees is
reported on the 2018 Schedule C, line 26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Schedule C (Form 10402018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8ML-LPNV].
103. Charitable contributions are entered on Schedule A, lines 11–14. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., Schedule A (Form 1040-2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sa--2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EGB2-B8M9].
104. For example, in a C corporate stock acquisition where a consolidated return will be filed,
the entity must attach a Form 1122 and 851 to the Form 1120 on which it must elect that it is a
consolidated return on line A. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return
Form 1120 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP6R-LWWL].
In such a situation, the tax attributes of the purchased stock carryover and require the consolidated
corporation to account for these attributes and ensure § 382 and § 383 limitations on such tax
attributes are considered. This is just a snippet of the complications involved in a corporate
acquisition.
105. 26 U.S.C. § 6012 requires annual reporting for all those required to prepare a return
under the income tax under Schedule A. 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2019). 26 U.S.C. § 6654 requires those
taxpayers required to make estimated tax payments to do so multiple times a year. Id. § 6654.
Likewise, 26 U.S.C. § 3102 requires that employers deduct payroll taxes whenever they pay
employees. Id. § 3102.
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Regardless of the type of taxpayer, any report to the IRS may prompt
questions as to the accuracy or completeness of the report. These questions
to the taxpayer may be automated inquiries prompted by mathematical errors
on the report or inconsistences between one taxpayer’s reporting and
another’s.106 The questions may also be prompted by suspicion of the return
reflected in a DIF score or some other curiosity.107 Of course, tax
professionals often represent taxpayers when the IRS questions the accuracy
or completeness of the reporting.108
If an audit is completed by the IRS but a dispute remains, then the taxpayer
has recourse to the courts. This final type of tax practice is litigation against
the government in these situations. The litigation may be in federal district
court, the Court of Claims, or the Tax Court, and may involve not only civil

106. The National Taxpayer Advocate points out that the audit process includes both “real”
and “unreal” audits. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, IRS TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 49, 50–
55
(2018),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017ARC/ARC17_Volume1_MSP_04_AuditRates.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QKB-E4M3]. “Real”
audits include correspondence audits (done through the mail and typically dealing with only a
few issues), field exams (which include face to face meetings with the taxpayer and dealing with
more complicated issues), and office audits (which are conducted at the local office and typically
split the difference in complexity with the other two). Id. “Unreal” audits are other investigative
functions which are not part of a formal audit, but which nevertheless require the taxpayer to
respond to IRS inquiries. Id. These are wide-ranging and include statutory authority to circumvent
normal deficiency procedures in certain cases involving math/clerical errors, the Automated
Underreporter Program which automatically matches informational returns and tax returns, a
program which seeks out possible fraud and requires the taxpayer to verify information, and the
Automated Substitute for Return (ASFR) process for taxpayers with significant tax liability but
who have failed to file a return. Id. Because these “unreal” audit functions do not count as an
“audit,” they are not constrained by some of the protections built into the formal audit process.
For example, a person subject to ASFR would still be eligible for a formal audit later. Id. See
CAROLINE RULE, IRS PROCEDURES: EXAMINATIONS AND APPEALS (PORTFOLIO 623), § IB (3d ed.
2013) (describing the mostly automated review of all tax returns). For discussions on DIF scores,
see Allen Madison, The IRS’s Tax Determination Authority, 71 TAX LAW. 143, 148 (2017); Lang
& Soled, supra note 67, at 432–33; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., I.R.S. FACT SHEET 2 (2006),
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-06-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PL-3AWG]
(“Some returns are selected for examination on the basis of computer scoring. Computer programs
give each return numeric ‘scores.’ The Discriminant Function System (DIF) score rates the
potential for change, based on past IRS experience with similar returns.”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 64–67.
107. Madison, supra note 106.
108. Note that attorneys, CPAs, and enrolled agents in good standing may “represent[] a
client at conferences, hearing, and meetings” with IRS officers and employees. 31 C.F.R
§§ 10.2(a)(4), 10.3(a)–(c) (2019). Enrolled actuaries, enrolled retirement plan agents, and
registered tax return preparers may also represent clients but only in specific situations. Id.
§ 10.3(d)–(f).
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claims about the correct characterization of the transaction, but also criminal
claims about the taxpayer’s knowledge, intentions, and behavior.109
The tax field is shared not only by multiple professionals but also by nonprofessionals.110 Any individual may prepare another’s tax return. While the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), located at Title 26 of the United States Code
(26 U.S.C.), prescribes penalties for improper reporting by a return
preparer,111 there are no education or qualification requirements or other
types of regulation for tax return preparers.112 While lawyers and CPAs who
109. ROBERT E. MCKENZIE, 1 REP. AUDITED TAXPAYER § 10:1 (2019). See generally,
ROBERT E. MCKENZIE, 1 REP. AUDITED TAXPAYER (2019). If the taxpayer cannot pay the tax up
front, the only available forum is the Tax Court (or bankruptcy court for certain issues). Id. at
§ 10:3. Certain I.R.C. sections impose criminal liability. For example, in a case where there is
intent to evade alleged rather than mere mistake, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2019) imposes criminal
penalties.
110. Attorneys, CPAs, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and enrolled retirement plan
agents may all represent clients in some capacity in front of the IRS. 31 C.F.R §§ 10.2–10.3
(2019).
111. 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (prescribing penalties for preparers who take an unreasonable position
which leads to understatement or who act recklessly/willfully which results in an understatement);
26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-1 (2019) (clarifying requirements in § 6694, including who counts as a return
preparer); Id. § 1.6694-2 (providing special rules and clarifications for the penalty for
understatements due to unreasonable positions).
112. For well over a decade, the National Taxpayer Advocate has called for regulating these
unregulated tax preparers. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2019 PURPLE BOOK, 10–12 (2018) (ebook).
Citing to numerous studies, the National Taxpayer Advocate states that these preparers produce
inaccurate returns and damage both taxpayers and the public. Id. The recommendation is for
Congress to amend 31 U.S.C. § 330 in order to allow the IRS to resume regulating them. Id. The
issues stemming from this lack of regulation are broad and well documented. It has been
suggested that such lack of regulation has led to an explosion in unqualified tax preparers that are
able to gain income from low-income taxpayers otherwise unable to pay through the EITC, which
was designed to help these same taxpayers who must use a portion of the credit to pay the preparer.
Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV.
151, 154 (2017). Though there are minor requirements that software companies update tax rates
and ensure accuracy of computations, there is virtually no testing to determine whether the
substantive advice provided by these companies is accurate. Id. at 164. While some returns are
undoubtedly simple, even the most complicated of returns can be completed by untrained and
unregulated tax preparers, whether they are done accurately or not. Id. at 171. There is evidence
to show that such unregulated return preparers are more likely to over-claim on EITC returns than
individuals preparing the return themselves. Id. If discovered, the potential harm that could befall
the taxpayer in these situations is considerable, including the loss of the ability to claim the EITC
for as long as 10 years in cases of fraud. Id. at 172. If the harm to the tax system isn’t enough,
many of these preparers charge customers hidden, and sometimes exorbitant, fees and issue highinterest loans. Id. at 173. Some authors contend that although there are serious issues with such
unregulated tax preparers, the same issues are also found in preparers that are already regulated.
Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation, 59 VILL.
L. REV. 515, 521–23 (2014). The largest effort to date of the IRS attempting to regulate this sector
of tax preparers was shot down in Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that
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prepare returns are subject to regulation by their professional bodies, the vast
majority of tax return preparers are not subjected to similar oversight.113 The
problems of unregulated tax preparers are predictable, well-documented, and
often discussed.114
The other tax services—planning and representation in audit and
litigation—are restricted to certain professionals. As discussed more fully
below, all written advice for avoiding taxes is considered to be “practice
before the IRS” and is limited to CPAs, lawyers, enrolled agents, and, in
limited ways, to enrolled actuaries and enrolled retirement plan agents.115 No
doubt tax planning advice is given by many others, including tax return
preparers, bookkeepers, business and financial advisors, friends, and family
members. But there are no practical means for the IRS to prevent such, and
with respect to many transactions, such as contributions to education, health,
and retirement savings accounts, the planning advice may be
unproblematic.116 In contrast, the IRS does have the practical means to limit
who represents a taxpayer in an audit, and that representation is limited by
the rules of the IRS.117 If the representation before the IRS becomes
the IRS did not have authority to promulgate the regs). However, some states do in fact regulate
such tax preparers. California requires paid preparers to post a bond, take a qualifying educational
course, and obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) from the IRS. Registered Tax
Preparers, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, ftb.ca.gov/tax-pros/california-tax-educationcouncil.html [https://perma.cc/2XFF-U4AN] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). Likewise, Oregon also
requires completion of educational courses, obtaining a PTIN, and passing an exam. OR. REV.
STAT. § 673.625 (2019).
113. Lawyers are regulated by their respective jurisdictions, and CPAs are regulated by their
state accountancy boards. AICPA members are regulated by it, though ABA members are not
regulated by the ABA. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 7–8.
114. See supra note 112.
115. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.2(a)(4), 10.3. Unlike enrolled actuaries and enrolled retirement plan
agents, attorneys, CPAs, and enrolled agents have general authorization to engage in tax practice.
116. The bases for such advice are frequently found in popular media. Jamie Hopkins,
Understanding Tax Benefits Of 529 Plans, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:09 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2016/09/15/understanding-the-tax-benefits-of-529plans/#4cc084b319aa [https://perma.cc/3L8J-YLC2] (discussing the tax benefits of qualified
tuition plans authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 529); Sarah Max, Millions of Americans Ignore This
Ultra-Valuable Tax Break. Here’s How to Get It., MONEY (Apr. 13, 2018),
http://money.com/money/5238579/millions-of-americans-ignore-this-ultra-valuable-tax-breakheres-how-to-get-it/ [https://perma.cc/6D59-JH2H] (discussing the tax benefits of contributing
money to a Health Savings Account); Teresa Mears, 7 Retirement Accounts You Should Consider,
U.S.
NEWS
AND
WORLD
REP.
(Jan.
23,
2019,
10:40
AM),
https://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/retirement-accounts-you-should-consider
[https://perma.cc/C54M-QK4F] (discussing and explaining various retirement savings options
and attendant tax benefits).
117. The Annual Filing Season Program (AFSP) replaced the mandatory structure rendered
void in Loving with a voluntary system aimed at the same group of generally unregulated return
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representation before a court, then it is the rules of the courts, rather than the
rules of the IRS, that apply. In Tax Court, non-attorneys who pass an
examination may represent clients,118 though, in the other courts, only
attorneys may represent clients.119
Of the four tax services that CPAs and lawyers provide, 120 the greatest AI
potential is with respect to planning. Compliance and dispute resolution
programs are already progressing steadily. As mentioned above, tax
compliance work has been computerized for decades now, and indeed
preparers. Kelly Phillips Erb, Congress Again Considers Licensing Tax Preparers, FORBES (Aug.
2, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/08/02/congress-againconsiders-licensing-tax-preparers/#131d0f392731 [https://perma.cc/B8D2-AZYT]. The IRS has
a tool which allows users to look for a return preparer based on multiple credentials including
participation in the AFSP. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DIRECTORY OF FEDERAL TAX RETURN
PREPARERS WITH CREDENTIALS AND SELECT QUALIFICATIONS, https://irs.treasury.gov/rpo/rpo.jsf
[https://perma.cc/5BQT-U3R7] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
118. 20 T.C.R. § 200(a)(3) (2012).
119. R.C.F.C. Rule 83.1 governs admission to the Court of Federal Claims and requires the
applicant to be a member of the bar of the highest court in their territory or state. Admission to
practice before district courts are governed by local rules, all of which require the applicant to be
a practicing attorney. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. CIV. L. R. § 11-1.
120. Of the various professionals and non-professionals who work in the tax field, the
remainder of this article will be devoted to considering CPAs and lawyers. As the two dominant
tax professions, CPAs and lawyers and have long competed for tax work. In the 1950s and 1960s,
concerns over how the tax field ought to be divided between lawyers and accountants became
substantial. Whether or not accountants who engaged in tax-related work were engaging in the
practice of law was a common question. See, e.g., Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1954). In 1961, the ABA prohibited lawyers who were accountants from
practicing in both professions, and the following year the ABA prohibited lawyers who were
accountants from holding themselves out as accountants. Michael S. Ariens, American Legal
Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 436 (2008). Maintaining the division
between lawyers and accountants was a high priority for many lawyers. Id. Harvard Law Dean
Erwin Griswold said of this time that “the two great professions of law and accountancy were
squared away for a battle royal.” Erwin N. Griswold, Comment, Role of Lawyer in Tax Practice,
10 U.S.C. SCH. L., MAJOR TAX PLANNING 1, 1 (1958) (commenting on the consequence of the
Agran case creating strife between lawyers and accountants); see also Erwin N. Griswold,
Lawyers, Accountants and Taxes, 10 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 52 (1955), reprinted in 18 TEX. B.
J. 109 (1955); Erwin N. Griswold, The Tax Practice Problem I: A Further Look at Lawyers and
Accountants, J. ACCT. 29 (1955). The National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants has recognized both professions as qualified but have articulated principles that
roughly divide the work. The Conference recognizes that both lawyers and CPAs are qualified to
determine the probable tax effects of a transaction, but CPAs are encouraged to consult lawyers
as to the interpretation or application of laws, and lawyers are encouraged to consults with CPAs
as to describing the transaction in money terms or interpreting financial results. Preparing legal
documents is the special expertise of lawyers while preparing financial statements and similar
reports is the special expertise of CPAs. While both lawyers and CPAs are entitled to represent
clients in Tax Court, the Conference advises CPAs to consult with lawyers when doing so. Nat’l
Conference of Lawyers and Certified Pub. Accountants, A Study of Interprofessional
Relationships, 56 A.B.A. J. 776, 778–80 (1970).
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virtually no compliance remains uncomputerized.121 Advances in
computerizing this aspect of tax practice seem likely to be persistent and
incremental. What seems most likely are advances in data gathering and
reporting that may make real-time reporting of transactions commonplace.122
Professional services in audit representation and litigation will benefit as
computer applications for resolving disputes of all types are improved.
Whether the controversy is still within the audit stages or in the later litigation
stages, the professional tasks are largely the same: devising and assessing
legal arguments that fit the facts as they are. For these purposes, the
computerization advances that benefit all litigators benefit the CPA and the
tax lawyer. As AI advances improve the results of database search results,
speed document review,123 and reliably predict what judges or opposing
counsel will do,124 litigators in all fields will benefit.
B. AI in Tax Planning
The greatest twenty-first-century potential for AI for tax professionals
remains as predicted in the 1970s: computerized tax planning for businesses.
The earliest attempts to computerize business tax planning were to minimize
taxes in corporate reorganizations, stock redemptions, and specific foreign
investments.125 Today’s cutting-edge work in AI and taxation has attempted
to apply the technological advances since the 1970s to achieve a considerably
more technically complex goal: creating previously undetected tax

121. See supra text accompanying notes 68–92.
122. Peter Horadan, The Future of Tax Compliance: Real-Time and Extensive DataSsharing,
ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-futureof-tax-compliance-real-time-and-extensive-data-sharing [https://perma.cc/Q492-QCCU]. For an
example of a system that has been operating and improving for almost two decades, see the
Streamlined Sales Tax Project. What is the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP)?, SALES TAX
INST.,
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/sales_tax_faqs/streamlined_sales_tax_project_sstp
[https://perma.cc/3HV9-GPKC] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
123. See Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 515–16 (explaining the development of
computerized research from keyword searches to statistically-based predictions of results).
124. See, e.g., Docket Alarm, supra note 31, at 47 (“creat[ing] a statistical model of the ways
that judges and courts decide cases” by discerning patterns and developing predictive analytics
from millions of court and agency documents); Gavelytics, supra note 31, at 49 (using natural
language and guided machine learning to evaluate court documents and provide metrics about
trial court judge behavior, including judicial speed, by providing a “gavel score”).
125. See Hellawell, supra note 72, at 1363 (a computer program for efficient stock
redemption tax planning); Hellawell, supra note 74, at 339 (for U.S. tax planning of foreign
mining investments); and Thorne McCarty, supra note 68, at 837 (a program for corporate
reorganization tax planning).
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shelters.126 For almost fifty years there has been interest in applying cuttingedge computer programming to the business tax planning that is the bailiwick
of CPAs and lawyers. With the exponential growth in processor speeds, the
continuing reductions in data storage costs, and the ongoing advances in AI
techniques, these aspirations presumably will be met.127
The allure of using AI in ex ante business tax planning is two-fold. First
is obvious: the money. The total receipts of U.S. businesses each year exceeds
$37 trillion,128 and U.S. businesses are subject to federal income tax rates up
to 37%.129
Second is the complexity of the taxation of that money. Those businesses
are organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, S corporations, and C
corporations.130 While all businesses are subject to overlapping sections of
the I.R.C., each of the entities has its own specific subchapter of the I.R.C.
with the result that the taxation of any given business is determined with
potential reference to hundreds of separate sections. There are about 25
million (non-farm) sole proprietorships, 3.5 million partnerships, 4.3 million
S corporations, and 1.6 million C corporations.131 The income of the first
three is passed through to their owners’ returns, and the owners are liable for
the taxes, while the income of a C corporation is reported on its own return,
and it is liable for the taxes.132
Adding to that complexity are the various non-tax aspects of businesses.
First, the federal tax characterization and the state law characterization of an
organization may not align. For example, a state law limited liability
company may be characterized as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, an S

126. See THE STEALTH PROJECT, supra note 91 (computer scientists at the MIT Computer
Science & Artificial Intelligence Lab are working to generate new Subchapter K tax shelters so
that the IRS can detect the shelters).
127. See Katz, supra note 23, at 922 (on the non-linear development of AI).
128. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1980–2013 SOI TAX STATS – INTEGRATED BUSINESS DATA,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-integrated-business-data
[https://perma.cc/YH9WMWHZ] (look to “Table 1: Selected financial data on businesses” and then follow the “1980–
2013” hyperlink).
129. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2019) (the highest marginal rate for any taxpayer is that of
individuals: currently, 37%.); see, e.g., Scott Greenberg, Pass-Through Businesses: Data and
Policy, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 17, 2017) https://taxfoundation.org/pass-through-businesses-data-andpolicy/ [https://perma.cc/3JGM-8TPY] (an overview of the taxation of pass-through businesses).
Since the income of pass-through businesses is taxed to its owners, the income is taxed at the
owners’ rates.
130. See Greenberg, supra note 129.
131. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 128.
132. See Greenberg, supra note 129.
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corporation, or a C corporation for federal tax purposes.133 A second
complication is the non-tax relationship between the business owners and the
organization: many businesses are closely-held with a close overlap between
management and ownership, while many other (and usually larger)
businesses have little to no overlap between management and ownership.134
A related complication is the relationship between the business and
employees: in many closely held businesses the owner-managers are also
employees, but in more widely held businesses there are few employees who
are significant owners or managers.135 And the most obvious non-tax
complication for planning is the indescribable variation in business models,
locations, and histories. For some estimation of the varieties of businesses,
consider that the list of North American Industry Classification System code
numbers the IRS requires taxpayers to use in categorizing their businesses
runs over 900 pages.136
In order to speculate on the future of AI in ex ante business tax planning,
it is useful to have a rough grasp of how tax planning occurs. Though in
practical reality the steps are not cleanly distinct and sequential, there are five
logical parts to a tax plan. First, the tax professional notices a potentially
relevant tax issue either in a business goal presented by the client or in the
professional’s review of the client’s operations. The issue is relevant to the
extent it may impact the client’s tax liability. Second, the tax professional
researches the facts and the law, identifying uncertainties in either. This
research is similar to a litigator’s research: reviewing documents; talking to
witnesses; and reading statutes, regulations, and case law. Third, in a step not
available to those forced to try the case on the facts before them, the ex ante
planner determines what the future facts should be and determines how best
to create them; that is, the professional determines what actions the client
should take and, perhaps, what actions the client should attempt to cause
others to take. The plan is refined by further interactions with the client and
others. Fourth, either formally or informally, the planner advises the client on
133. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8832: ENTITY CLASSIFICATION ELECTION AND
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf [https://perma.cc/
97D4-WW88].
134. DAVID L. GIBBERMAN & GERALYN A. JOVER-LEDESMA, 2019 PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS
TAXATION ¶ 601.02 (Jennifer Schencker et.al. eds., 2018).
135. Id.
136. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, N. AM. INDUS.
CLASSIFICATION
SYS.
MANUAL
(2017),
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CBT-9QZZ]; My NAICS Code, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Aug. 24,
2019), https://www.census.gov/smallbusiness/html/naics.html [https://perma.cc/JR26-MVPS]
(explaining the North American Industry Classification System).
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the appropriate characterization of the plan on the client’s future return,
which may or may not be prepared by the planner. Finally, the plan is
implemented through the series of actions, transactions, and documents
advised by the planner.
How might AI applications change this process? The greatest
transformation of tax planning by AI would be eliminating the need of the
tax professional to identify the potentially relevant tax issues. Instead, the
process would begin with as much information about the client’s situation as
is available being delivered into the AI system. An impressive feat of AI is
its ability to detect patterns and identify relevance by searching for
connections in the data provided to it by the human users—patterns and
connections not previously identified by, or perhaps even noticed by, the
human users.137 Within this information the AI system would detect patterns
and connections, and from those identify relevant law and planning
opportunities. The information to be delivered would include a full
description of the client’s taxpaying and state law status and relationship with
other businesses (e.g., a state law limited liability company taxed as a S
corporation with overlapping ownership with another S corporation); past,
present, and projected financial information; personal information on
shareholders and employees (e.g., overlap between the two, relationships,
ages, financial information); and the short-, mid-, and long-term goals of the
client.138 The AI could be expected to generate better results with access to a
greater quantity and quality of information. The AI system would assess the
information, adjusting for uncertainties and missing information and making
estimates and predictions when useful.139
With the relevant legal issues identified and the facts duly assessed, AI
could then generate a customized tax plan, drawing not only on the I.R.C.,
Treasury Regulations, case law, and IRS announcements, rulings, and
publications but also on the vast number of secondary sources on tax and
business planning, as well as from the AI system’s own prior suggestions.140
137. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 3, at 147 (describing programs that take a large amount of
data and then makes conclusions concerning common features without either labelling the data or
human correction); Rostain, supra note 33, at 562–63 (in contrast to expert systems that embed
rules to sort data, data-driven systems infer relations in unstructured data).
138. To begin understanding the vast range of factors that should be considered in business
planning, see, for example, Dwight Drake, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 23–
47 (Jesse H. Chopper et al. eds., 4th ed. 2013).
139. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 3, at 142 (AI fuzzy logic).
140. AI has not yet proven itself able to “suggest new and promising combinations of existing
arguments tailored to a client’s factual circumstances,” even though it has proven itself in
predicting how issues will be resolved in the courts. See Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 549.
Much contemporary AI is designed to learn from its own operations. See Calo, supra note 15, at
405; Karnow, supra note 3, at 174; Rostain, supra note 33, at 562–63.

1090

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

As to the legal uncertainties, AI could research and resolve those
uncertainties to an acceptable degree of confidence. As even the first
available tax-specific legal research AI provided the user with the probability
of a particular tax characterization being successful, it is easy to expect future
AI to generate not only a plan but an assurance of the degree of confidence
as to its appropriate characterization on the client’s future return.141 As
described below, technically specified degrees of confidence are necessary to
protect the taxpayer from penalty if the characterization is determined
incorrect.142 Those degrees of confidence include the position having a
reasonable basis, substantial authority, or it being reasonable to believe the
position was more likely than not to sustain scrutiny.143 Often not only the
last level of confidence but also the first ones are expressed, at least
informally, as probabilities of success on the merits if the position is
ultimately tested in court.144
One of the most useful functions of tax planning AI might be its ability to
answer factual, not just legal, questions. Getting the facts in place is essential
for the success of any tax plan. For example, whether or not a particular
employee’s compensation is reasonable is a fact issue shared by many tax
plans and an issue often audited by the IRS.145 On the most fundamental level,
compensation is not deductible by an employer if it exceeds a reasonable
amount.146 But the issue also comes up in planning with both closely held C
corporations and S corporations.147 For C corporation clients with
shareholders that are also employees, a common tax plan is to minimize the
141. See supra text accompanying note 88.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 181–93.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. For a discussion of the importance of determining reasonableness of compensation and
methods for determining and defending such levels, see Robert J. Grossman, The Reasonable
Compensation Job Aid, 98 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 308 (2017); Edward R. Rataj & Priya J.
Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series: Part One, 97 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 209 (2016);
Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series Part Two: Elements of
Compensation, 97 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 269 (2016); Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila,
Reasonable Compensation Series Part Three: Market Analysis Considerations, 98 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 330 (2017); Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series
Part Four: Market Competitive Compensation Data, 98 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 27 (2017);
Edward R. Rataj & Priya J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series Part Five: Fundamental
Compensation-Related Statistics, 98 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 91 (2017); Edward R. Rataj & Priya
J. Kapila, Reasonable Compensation Series Part Six: Standard Methodology, 98 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 154 (2017).
146. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2018) (permits only reasonable compensation to be deducted from the
gross income of a business). See also GIBBERMAN & JOVER-LEDESMA, supra note 134, at ¶ 601.02;
Grossman, supra note 145, at 308.
147. See GIBBERMAN & JOVER-LEDESMA, supra note 134, at ¶ 601.02.
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distributions to the shareholder-employees that can be characterized as
dividends and to maximize the distributions that can be characterized as
compensation.148 But for S corporations with shareholder-employees, the
plan is to minimize the compensation characterizations and maximize the
dividend characterizations.149 In both cases, the tax minimization success
depends upon the dollar amounts characterized as compensation being
reasonable, in fact.150 AI could generate not only the appropriate plan for the
S corporation shareholder-employee, for example, but it could also determine
the best dollar amount to be characterized as compensation and the best dollar
amount as dividends by drawing on information about the employee’s
qualifications, experience, duties, compensation history, and information on
compensation in relevant industries.151 Similar issues, which today are
handled by human experts, could be handled by AI as an integral part of its
advice-generation. A tax planning AI that could address similar factual
issues, such as the valuation of assets, for example, of equity capital interests
in business enterprises, including corporations, partnerships, and limited
liability companies, and whether or not a transaction has non-tax economic
substance, which is essential to avoiding the penalties for transactions that
lack such substance, would be extraordinarily valuable.152
The value of AI would be amplified by its speed and ease. In the most
obvious way, speed and ease benefit the client. The transformative potential
is at the extremes of speed and ease where tax planning ceases to be an
occasional process, a process prompted by a business life cycle event,
transaction, or other extraordinary occasion. Instead, tax planning could
become a continuous process: the continuous, even real-time delivery of
information to AI with continuous, even real-time tax minimization planning
being delivered by AI.153
The great appeal of tax planning AI would be its ability to quickly and
perhaps continuously resolve legal and factual issues in generating a tax plan
148. A dividend paid by a C corporation is not deductible by the corporation, but reasonable
compensation is deductible. Thus, for shareholder-employees it is more advantageous to the
corporation’s ultimate tax liability to pay compensation than it is to pay dividends. Both are
taxable the shareholder-employee’s income. Id.
149. A dividend paid by an S corporation is not taxable to a shareholder’s income though
compensation paid to a shareholder-employee is. Thus, unlike the situation with the C corporation
shareholder-employees, those in an S corporation benefit from having payments characterized as
dividends rather than compensation. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. On the importance of the valuation of equity capital interests in business enterprises,
including corporations, partnerships and limited liability companies, see, for example, Robert J.
Grossman, Enterprise Valuation After the TCJA, 101 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 19 (2018).
153. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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and assessing the probability of its enduring audit and litigation. AI could be
used to address the tax planning opportunities in the initial organization,
subsequent reorganizations, and final liquidation of a business, and the
comings and goings of its owners and employees, its payment of expenses,
receipt of income, distributions of profits, its borrowing and lending, its
expanding and contracting, and all transactions both within and beyond its
ordinary course of business. Some of the opportunities spotted by AI, and
some of the plans generated, would be well known to experienced business
tax professionals. But, the great potential of tax planning appeal is that, at
least sometimes, AI might be better at spotting opportunities and generating
plans than those same experienced professionals. Along with speeding and
easing the tax planning, it is this potential for AI to deliver a better plan that
would lure professionals into AI.
IV.

PROFESSIONALISM, AI, AND TAX PLANNING
A. Professional Responsibility Concerns

What are the professional responsibility concerns of tax professionals
working with AI as imagined above? The potential as imagined is for AI to
function itself as a tax planner. Identifying relevant facts and laws, making
appropriate assumptions and estimations, applying the law to the facts, and
then inferring opportunities and assessing the legal risks of pursuing those
opportunities is, in short, what CPAs and tax lawyers do. What needs to be
considered is the professional responsibility of tax professionals working
with what is, in some sense, their technological substitute and that, in some
cases, performs not only as well as but better than the professionals.
Setting aside concerns that direct taxpayer use of tax planning AI could
displace tax planning professionals in many situations, the concern at hand is
articulating the right use of tax planning AI by professionals. Tax
professionals are often said to have two duties: one to the system and one to
the client.154 This duty to the system has been described variously as the duty
154. See, e.g., GALLER & LANG, supra note 4; Schenk, supra note 4, at 2005 (claims the selfreporting nature of the tax system means that the tax system cannot permit the “absolute
adversarial” relationship that lawyers might have in other situations). The idea that the
professional responsibility of tax professionals must be framed within the self-reporting nature of
our tax system, seems the most common argument for tax lawyers’ duty to the system. Id.; see
also WOLFMAN, HOLDEN, & HARRIS, supra note 4, at § 101.2; Infanti, supra note 4. However,
some have criticized this conception of the tax lawyer. See, e.g., David J. Moraine, Loyalty
Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Others—the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made
Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 190–91 (2009).
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to the government, the Treasury, the public interest, and the duty to our
self-assessing tax system.155 This duty has been premised on the alignment
of patriotism, professionalism, respect for democratic government funded by
taxes, and the need of each citizen to pay his or her share.156 It is the
recognition that the government needs revenue to fund the public good, and
that the professional must not lose sight of her and her client’s benefit from
government services when advising the client on tax minimization. It is, at
the least, the recognition that professionally responsible advising protects the
interest of the public and not just those of the client and the professional. It
means, in the most practical terms, that the advice not be too aggressive or
ever premised on its likelihood of escaping detection and question.157 It is
within this context of the tax professional as gatekeeper that the professional
pursues her duty to minimize her client’s tax liabilities without exposing the
client to undue risk of controversy, litigation, and penalties. The bottom line
for tax professionals is found in balancing cleverness with caution, accepting
that what is at stake is both the public’s good and the client’s good.
This balancing requires the CPA or tax lawyer to understand the facts and
law well enough to be able to adequately advise the client. If the tax
professional does not understand, then she cannot balance the risks and
rewards with good judgment. If she does not understand, then she cannot
explain the risks and rewards to the client in a way that allows the client to
understand and weigh and choose the way forward.158 The client’s relative
lack of understanding is an important part of the relationship with a
professional. A patient’s inability to understand what stage three nonHodgkins lymphoma is relative to the oncologist’s understanding is part of
what makes the oncologist the professional. A professional relationship is
155. E.g., Edmond Cahn et al., Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners: Transcript of Tax Law
Review’s 1952 Banquet, 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 10 (1952) (“treasury” was used in the statements by
Thomas N. Tarleau); Norris Darrell, Conscience and Propriety in Tax Practice, 17 N.Y.U. ANN.
INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1, 2 (1959) (using the term “self-assessing income tax system”); Mark H.
Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to his Client and to the
Government?—the Theory, 15 U.S.C. L. SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAX PLAN. 15 (1963) (using the
term “government”); John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer’s Tax Practice, 13
TAX L. REV. 27, 44 (1957) (using the term “public interest”); Milton Young, Does the Tax
Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to His Client and to the Government?—the Practice, 15
U.S.C. L. SCH. INST. ON MAJOR TAX PLAN. 39 (1963) (using the term “government”).
156. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N
1067, 1083 (1952).
157. The taxpayer and return preparer penalty regimes described below are aimed to
constrain aggressive advice. The requirement that the advice is not premised on escaping audit is
described by various authorities. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662–4(d)(2) (2019); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.6694–2(b)(1) (2019); 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a)(vi) (2014).
158. The unstructured communication involved in client counseling is likely to long remain
beyond the functionality of AI. See Remus & Levy, supra note 10, at 538.

1094

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

always an unequal one. It requires trust and deference by the patient/client,
and it requires an expert understanding of the situation by the professional—
an understanding that, by definition, surpasses that of the patient/client. A
professional with an irresponsibly low understanding might encourage a
patient/client to assume greater risks or forego greater rewards than the
patient/client would choose if she had an expert’s understanding of the risks
and rewards. A tax professional with an irresponsibly inadequate
understanding either might induce the client to claim overly aggressive tax
benefits with unacceptably high risks of legal defeat and financial penalties
or, equally irresponsibly, might preclude the client from claiming tax benefits
to which she is certainly entitled.
A professionally adequate understanding of the facts and laws benefits not
only the client by enabling her to minimize her taxes without undue risks but
also the public good. When public resources are spent enforcing laws that
adequate professional advice would have kept the taxpayer from violating,
the efficiency of the taxing system is diminished by the increased
administrative costs. And when the taxpayer with an illegally low tax liability
escapes detection or enforcement, then the total revenue that should have
been collected for the public good is diminished.159 Either through the
increased costs or decreased revenue, the public good is harmed. Thus, the
duty of the tax professional to understand well enough to advise and explain
reflects the professional duty to both the system and the client.
With the potential for the tax planning AI used by the professional to
become a technological substitute for the professional’s understanding, the
temptation will be for the professional to defer to the AI analysis in every
instance. This temptation will be as strong as the AI seems good. But by
deferring, the professional would make the AI into a substitute for the
professional. The heart of professionalism lies in asserting judgement, not in
159. Periodically, the IRS estimates the level of compliance with federal revenue laws by
estimating the tax gap. From its most recent report: “The gross tax gap is the amount of true tax
liability that is not paid voluntarily and timely. The estimated gross tax gap is $458 billion. The
net tax gap is the gross tax gap less tax that will be subsequently collected, either paid voluntarily
or as the result of IRS administrative and enforcement activities; it is the portion of the gross tax
gap that will not be paid. It is estimated that $52 billion of the gross tax gap will eventually be
collected resulting in a net tax gap of $406 billion. The voluntary compliance rate (VCR) is a ratio
measure of relative compliance and is defined as the amount of tax paid voluntarily and timely
divided by total true tax, expressed as a percentage. The VCR corresponds to the gross tax gap.
The estimated VCR is 81.7 percent. The net compliance rate (NCR) is a ratio measure
corresponding to the net tax gap. The NCR is defined as the sum of ‘tax paid voluntarily and
timely’ and ‘enforced and other late payments’ divided by ‘total true tax’, expressed as a
percentage. The estimated NCR is 83.7 percent.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES
FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010 at 1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20
gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/979X-2QN5].
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substituting another’s judgment for one’s own, even when the other’s
competence may equal or exceed one’s own, and even when the other is not
human.
In articulating the standards of professional responsibility for CPAs and
tax lawyers, the hard problem is that AI will be useful to them exactly to the
extent it approaches or exceeds their quality of function. In other words, AI
will be useful to the extent they can rely on it as a substitute for their own
work. But the problem is not as novel as it may seem. No one suggests that
professionalism requires accountants to work out by hand or abacus the
calculations in their Excel spreadsheets. Nor does anyone suggest lawyers
second-guess their Lexis or Westlaw search results by double-checking their
research with library books.
These and countless other technologies professionals rely upon without
controversy because, due to the reputation of these products and their longterm and wide-spread use, reliance on the products is professionally
appropriate. That no one marvels at their wizardry is not evidence that the
products are not marvelously powerful and useful, but, rather simply, that
they have become commonplace. Perhaps in fifty years, our professional
descendants will no more marvel at what AI has become than we marvel at
Excel or Lexis. That seems likely once we consider that our professional
ancestors fifty years back would no doubt marvel at what we can do in our
palms.
Yet the burden to begin articulating appropriate standards for using AI is
on this generation because we will be the first to use it. The starting point is
recognizing what AI has in common with technologies that are indisputably
reasonable for professionals to use. We do not doubt it is appropriate for
professionals to use spreadsheets and databases, though we expect them to
use ones with good reputations for quality and to use them correctly and to
understand something of their designs and limits. And this is what we should
expect of professionals using AI.
AI as imagined and predicted is, however, distinguishable from the
technologies currently used. It is not merely that the shine and novelty has
worn off those technologies. The promise of AI is to do more: it is to deliver
advice almost equivalent, if not equivalent, to a human expert’s. The concern
at hand is to articulate how tax professionals should use it. But the problem
may not be as novel as it first seems. CPAs and tax lawyers have professional
standards for how to use advice given them by other humans. Ignoring the
temptation to focus on the source of the completed work product being either
human or digital, the standards for determining when it is reasonable for a
professional to rely upon another professional’s advice are the most
analogous to the use of AI we expect—and hope or fear—will emerge.
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B. Professional Responsibility Standards
1.

Federal Standards: Taxpayer Penalties

To discuss the professional duties of tax professionals, it is useful to
introduce the legal duties of their clients, the taxpayers. The U.S. federal
income tax system is one of self-reporting. The government does not provide
taxpayers with bills, but rather taxpayers are obligated to file a return they
believe to be true and correct in all material matters.160 The taxpayer is
responsible for gathering the relevant facts and applying the relevant law to
determine and report the liability for the year. Generally, the annual return
does not describe the legal argument behind a taxpayer’s characterization
(e.g., that the expense is deductible).161 Nor, generally, does it require
providing underlying information (e.g., receipts) with the return, though the
taxpayer has the duty to keep adequate books and records to substantiate what
was reported.162 Once the return is filed, it is subject to an automated review,
which checks for mathematical errors and compares the information on the
return with information the IRS has obtained elsewhere, and also assesses the
likelihood of errors on the return.163
If the review by the IRS determines the taxpayer understated the liability
due, and the taxpayer acquiesces in the determination or a court upholds it,
the taxpayer must pay the additional tax along with interest.164 However, the
taxpayer may not necessarily be subjected to penalties. A taxpayer who was

160. On the government providing ready returns to taxpayers, see Joseph Bankman, Simple
Filing for Average Citizens: The California ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431, 1431 (2005);
Mock & Shurtz, supra note 77, at 529. But see Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph
Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53 (2007);
William Ahern, “ReadyReturn” a Bad Idea That’s Hard To Kill, TAX FOUND. (2009),
https://taxfoundation.org/readyreturn-bad-idea-thats-hard-kill/ [https://perma.cc/54UG-43W5].
161. For example, a sole proprietor would deduct reasonable compensation in the expenses
line on their Schedule C, line 26. The 2018 Schedule C instructions for line 26 only require the
taxpayer to reduce the amount by enumerated credits where applicable. No analysis on the amount
is otherwise required. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE C, C-9
(2018).
162. 26 U.S.C. § 6001 (2018) requires taxpayers to maintain records to substantiate their
returns though they don’t necessarily have to turn those records in with their return. For example,
a person claiming a charitable deduction would enter the amount they gave in cash on Schedule
A, line 11. The instructions for Schedule A, however, explicitly state that the taxpayer should not
attach receipts to substantiate the amount, but rather, merely keep the records. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE A, A-10 (2018).
163. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 106, at 2.
164. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651–63 provide for non-penalty additions to tax. For an explanation, see
MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55:1, 55:7–8 (Hersel Shadian ed., 2018).
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not negligent in the return-filing process and whose understated liability was
not substantial will not be penalized.165
Internal Revenue Code section 6662 provides the penalty structure for
taxpayers who were negligent, substantially understated the income tax
liability, or claimed tax benefits from a transaction that lacked economic
substance.166 There are exceptions to the penalties for both negligence and
substantial understatement of liabilities, but the penalty for claiming benefits
from transactions without economic substance cannot be avoided.167
If the taxpayer’s position has a “reasonable basis,” even though it was
incorrect, then the taxpayer will not be considered negligent.168 The Treasury
Regulations describe the reasonable basis standard as “a relatively high
standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not
patently improper.”169 Informally, a position with a reasonable basis is often
said to have a 10% to 20% chance of success on the merits, if litigated.170
The taxpayer is at risk of an understatement penalty only if the
understatement is substantial.171 But even if the understatement is substantial,
the taxpayer will be protected from penalty in several situations. First is if the
position had a reasonable basis and was disclosed to the IRS when the return
was filed. Second is if the position had “substantial authority,” even if it was
not disclosed to the IRS.172 “Substantial authority” is as an objective measure
of the weight of authorities in favor of the position.173 Informally, positions
with substantial authority are often said to have at least a 40% chance of
165. MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 164, § 55:6.
166. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2018) (indicating negligence and disregard of rules or
regulations), (2) (indicating substantial understatement), and (6) (indicating tax benefits claimed
from transaction lacking economic substance). Id. § 6662 imposes several other penalties. For
example, 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(3) penalizes substantial valuation misstatements. Id. § 6663(a)
imposes a hefty penalty where an underpayment is due to fraud. Id. § 7206 imposes monetary and
criminal sanctions for fraud in some circumstances.
167. The penalty for claiming tax benefits from transactions that lack economic substance
cannot be avoided once the transaction has been determined to lack economic substance. 26
U.S.C. § 6664(c)(2), (d)(2) (2018). On the codification into the penalty regime of this long-time,
court-created doctrine, see Richard M. Lipton, ‘Codification’ of the Economic Substance
Doctrine—Much Ado About Nothing?, 112 J. TAX’N 325, 325 (2010).
168. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (2018) provides that a return position with a “reasonable
basis” is not attributable to negligence.
169. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2018).
170. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the
‘Should’ Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003).
171. Generally, 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(1) (2018) defines an understatement as substantial if it
is greater than 10% of the correct amount or $5,000, except in the case of corporations. For
corporations, the understatement exceeds the lesser of (i) 10% of the correct amount (or $10,000,
if greater) or (ii) $10,000,000.
172. CUMMINGS, supra note 170.
173. Id.
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success on the merits.174 Neither a disclosed position with a reasonable basis
nor a position with substantial authority will protect the taxpayer if a tax
shelter was involved.175 If a tax shelter was involved, then the position must
have had substantial authority, and the taxpayer must have believed the
position was more likely than not to prevail (i.e., had a greater than 50%
chance of success) in order for the taxpayer to avoid the penalty.176
There is another defense for the taxpayer whose understatement did not
involve a tax shelter or a transaction without economic substance. Even if
there was negligence or a substantial understatement, the taxpayer will not be
penalized if “it [can be] shown that there was a reasonable cause” and “the
taxpayer acted in good faith.”177 The Treasury Regulations provide this is
determinable on “a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts
and circumstances,” including the “experience, knowledge, and education of
the taxpayer” and, most importantly, “the extent of the taxpayer’s effort.”178
Reliance on information, such as W-2 forms or valuation provided by others,
may have been reasonable and in good faith, as reliance on the advice or
opinion of a professional may have been. 179 With respect to the last, the
taxpayer’s “education, sophistication and business experience” is relevant as
is whether the taxpayer should have known the advisor lacked appropriate
knowledge of tax law and the facts (e.g., if the taxpayer failed to inform the
advisor of certain facts).180
2.

Federal Standards: Tax Return Preparer Penalties

The standards for tax return preparers reflect the penalty standards for
taxpayers.181 Generally, if a tax return preparer prepares a return resulting in
an understatement, then the position causing the understatement needs to
have had a reasonable basis and been disclosed or have had substantial
174. See id.
175. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2018). A tax shelter includes any plan if a significant
purpose is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax. Id. This definition of tax shelter has
been criticized. See Hatfield, supra note 100, at 700–05.
176. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(1), (f)(1) (2018). For corporate taxpayers, establishing this is
necessary but insufficient to avoid the penalty while for non-corporate taxpayers it is sufficient.
This regulation appears based on a prior but not the current statute. Both of these exceptions are
part of the reasonable cause exception for underpayments, and a corporate taxpayer must prove
the reasonable cause exception applies. GALLER AND LANG, supra note 4, at 53–54.
177. 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2018).
178. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2018).
179. Id.
180. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (2018).
181. For a discussion of the development of the standards and the changes from the
professional standards, see GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 150–58.
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authority so that the preparer escapes penalty.182 If the position involved a tax
shelter, then the preparer needs to have reasonably believed it was more likely
than not to succeed in order to escape penalty.183
As with taxpayers, there is also a reasonable cause exception: even if the
incorrect return position did not satisfy the appropriate standard, the preparer
will not be penalized so long as the understatement was due to reasonable
cause and the preparer acted in good faith.184 In determining whether or not
there was reasonable cause and good faith, the Treasury Regulations provide
that all the facts and circumstances are relevant, including whether the
provision was “complex, uncommon, or highly technical,” and whether the
normal office procedures of the preparer promoted accuracy and consistency
in such a way that errors like the one in question would be rare.185 The
Treasury Regulations explicitly provide that a preparer may, with reasonable
cause and good faith, rely on the advice of another return preparer or other
advisor without verifying the advice or information so long as: (i) the preparer
had reason to believe the other party was competent to give the advice or
information; (ii) the advice or information is not unreasonable on its face; (iii)
the other party was aware of all relevant facts (so far as the preparer knew or
should have known); (iv) there were no intervening developments of the law
that would make the advice unreliable; and (v) the return preparer makes
reasonable inquiries if what is provided (or its implications) appears incorrect
or incomplete.186
These penalties apply to “tax return preparers,” but that definition is
sufficiently broad to include professionals who never see the return.187 The
division between planner and preparer is the time at which advice is given.188
182. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2018). The return preparer may also be penalized in more
egregious situations too, of course. For example, anyone who prepares tax-related documents that
are “fraudulent” or “false as to any material matter” may be committing a felony under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(2), even if the false statement is not material to calculating the tax liability. United States
v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1974). There are many I.R.C. sections that impose criminal
sanctions. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201–17 (2018).
183. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C) (2018). This also applies to “reportable transactions” under
26 U.S.C. § 6662A.
184. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(3) (2018).
185. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-2(e)(1), (4) (2018).
186. Id. §§ 1.6694-1(e)(1), -2(e) (2018).
187. If less than 5% of the aggregate time incurred by the advisor with respect to the position
is after the events have occurred, he or she will not be considered a non-signing preparer. This is
a de minimis safe harbor. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36) (2018); 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-15(b)(2)(i)
(2018). It is also necessary that the position is related to a financially substantial amount. 26
C.F.R. § 301.7701–15(b)(3) (2018). For a discussion, see BORIS BITTKER, MARTIN MCMAHON &
LAWRENCE ZELENAK, Tax Return Preparers, in FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
¶ 46.03 (2018).
188. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELANAK, supra note 187.
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So long as the tax advice is given before the relevant transaction occurs, the
professional is an ex ante tax planner and not an ex post return preparer.189
However, a material amount of tax advice after the transaction occurs may
make the ex ante advisor into a “non-signing return preparer,” even if he or
she never sees the return.190
Indirectly, however, the return preparer penalty standards guide all
responsible ex ante tax planning professionals. First, of course, sometimes
the tax planner will prepare and file the return. Second, even if an advisor
will not prepare the return and does not anticipate providing advice after the
plan is implemented, there is always the chance that follow-up advice will be
needed by the client or the return preparer. And this can transform an advisor
into a non-signing return preparer. Finally, when giving tax advice, a planner
presumes his or her advice will be eventually reflected on the client’s return,
and the client will be subjected to penalties if there is an understatement and
the position did not meet the requisite confidence (and perhaps disclosure)
level.191
3.

Federal Standards: Circular 230

It is not only through these I.R.C. provisions and their regulation of return
preparers that the federal government regulates tax professionals. Congress
has authorized the IRS to regulate all who “practice before” it.192 As
mentioned above, this includes CPAs and lawyers who give written tax
advice, even though, perhaps counter-intuitively, it does not cover return

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. AICPA Statement on Standards for Tax Services (SSTS) No 7, Form and Content of
Advice to Taxpayers: Statement 3 (“A member should assume that tax advice provided to a
taxpayer will affect the manner in which the matters or transactions considered would be reported
or disclosed on the tax return. Therefore, for tax advice given to a taxpayer, the member should
consider, when relevant (a) return reporting and disclosure standards applicable to the related tax
return position and (b) the potential penalty consequences of the return position.”).
192. 31 U.S.C. § 330 provides the Secretary of the Treasury this authority with respect to
those practice before the Department of the Treasury. The IRS is an agency within the Treasury
Department.
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preparers as such.193 The Treasury Regulations governing these tax
professionals is known as “Circular 230.”194
While, for the most part, Circular 230 imposes standards for return
preparation that reflect those the I.R.C. imposes on taxpayers and returner
preparers, practitioners only violate those standards through willfulness,
recklessness, or gross incompetence.195 However there is nothing in the
I.R.C. similar to Circular 230’s regulation of written advice. Circular 230
regulates written advice on any “federal tax matter,” which is any “matter
concerning the application or interpretation of” any law or regulation
administered by the IRS.196 In writing its advice, the tax professional must
use reasonable efforts to ascertain all the relevant facts and take them into
consideration when relating the law to the facts, making reasonable
assumptions, as appropriate, and not relying on information provided by
others, if it would be unreasonable.197 There is a specific provision regarding

193. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2018) (“Practice before the Internal Revenue Service
comprehends all matters connected with a presentation to the Internal Revenue Service or any of
its officers or employees relating to a taxpayer’s rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or
regulations administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Such presentations include, but are not
limited to, preparing documents; filing documents; corresponding and communicating with the
Internal Revenue Service; rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan
or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion;
and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings.”) (emphasis added).
194. For a history of Circular 230, see Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation,
140 TAX NOTES 457, 457–62 (2013).
195. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2018) (standards with respect to tax returns). After the IRS was
denied the authority to regulate tax return preparers as such, see Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013
(2014), it is not clear how the return preparation standards apply to CPAs and lawyers who, other
than by preparing the return would not be considered to be practicing before the IRS under
§ 10.2(a)(4). GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 96.
196. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(d) (2019) (“A Federal tax matter, as used in this section, is any matter
concerning the application or interpretation of (1) A revenue provision as defined in
§ 6110(i)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code; (2) Any provision of law impacting a person’s
obligations under the internal revenue laws and regulations, including but not limited to the
person’s liability to pay tax or obligation to file returns; or (3) Any other law or regulation
administered by the I.R.S.”).
197. Id. § 10.37(a)(2) (2018) (“The practitioner must—(i) Base the written advice on
reasonable factual and legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events); (ii)
Reasonably consider all relevant facts and circumstances that the practitioner knows or reasonably
should know; (iii) Use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant to written
advice on each Federal tax matter; (iv) Not rely upon representations, statements, findings, or
agreements (including projections, financial forecasts, or appraisals) of the taxpayer or any other
person if reliance on them would be unreasonable; (v) Relate applicable law and authorities to
facts; and (vi) Not, in evaluating a [f]ederal tax matter, take into account the possibility that a tax
return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit.”).
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the professional’s reliance on the advice of others.198 It allows reliance when
it is reasonable and in good faith.199 It will not be in good faith if the
practitioner knows or reasonably should know that the advice is unreliable or
that the person is not competent.200 In applying these requirements, the IRS
will consider what a reasonable practitioner would have done.201
Echoing codes of professional responsibility, Circular 230 imposes
requirements of due diligence (§ 10.22) and competence (§ 10.35). As for the
latter, the practitioner must have “the appropriate level of knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation,” and can acquire such through consultation
with others or study.202 Practitioners are required to exercise due diligence,
but they will be presumed to have done so when relying on the work of
another person so long as “the practitioner used reasonable care in engaging,
supervising, training, and evaluating the person.”203

198. Id. § 10.37(b) (2018) (“Reliance on advice of others. A practitioner may only rely on
the advice of another person if the advice was reasonable and the reliance is in good faith
considering all the facts and circumstances. Reliance is not reasonable when—(1) The practitioner
knows or reasonably should know that the opinion of the other person should not be relied on; (2)
The practitioner knows or reasonably should know that the other person is not competent or lacks
the necessary qualifications to provide the advice; or (3) The practitioner knows or reasonably
should know that the other person has a conflict of interest in violation of the rules described in
this part.”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(c)(1) (2018) (“(c) Standard of review. (1) In evaluating whether a
practitioner giving written advice concerning one or more [f]ederal tax matters complied with the
requirements of this section, the Commissioner, or delegate, will apply a reasonable practitioner
standard, considering all facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the scope of the
engagement and the type and specificity of the advice sought by the client.”).
202. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(a) (2018) (“A practitioner must possess the necessary competence to
engage in practice before the Internal Revenue Service. Competent practice requires the
appropriate level of knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the matter for
which the practitioner is engaged. A practitioner may become competent for the matter for which
the practitioner has been engaged through various methods, such as consulting with experts in the
relevant area or studying the relevant law.”).
203. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (2018) (“(a) In general. A practitioner must exercise due diligence—
(1) In preparing or assisting in the preparation of, approving, and filing tax returns, documents,
affidavits, and other papers relating to Internal Revenue Service matters; (2) In determining the
correctness of oral or written representations made by the practitioner to the Department of the
Treasury; and (3) In determining the correctness of oral or written representations made by the
practitioner to clients with reference to any matter administered by the Internal Revenue Service.
(b) Reliance on others. Except as modified by §§ 10.34 and 10.37, a practitioner will be presumed
to have exercised due diligence for purposes of this section if the practitioner relies on the work
product of another person and the practitioner used reasonable care in engaging, supervising,
training, and evaluating the person, taking proper account of the nature of the relationship between
the practitioner and the person.”).
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Professional Association Standards: ABA and AICPA

CPAs and lawyers are also regulated by their professional associations.
For lawyers, the ABA has issued its Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which have been adopted (in some form or another) in almost every
jurisdiction.204 It is the jurisdiction that has the authority to regulate and
discipline lawyers, not the ABA, though the ABA does issue opinions on
professional responsibility situations that may be persuasive to the local
bars.205
For lawyers, the first rule for professional conduct is competence: “A
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”206 This includes
using “methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners.”207 In some situations, the competent lawyer may need to
involve the services of another lawyer.208 This is permitted if the lawyer
“reasonably believe[s] that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the
competent and ethical representation of the client.”209 The reasonableness
will depend, in part, upon the education, experience, and reputation of the
other lawyer and the nature of the services assigned to him or her.210 A lawyer
is also required to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness.”211 This
latter requirement has been taken to mean that not only will the lawyer be
204. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1-1(e)(4) (2018–2019 ed.).
205. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 7.
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“Competent
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements
of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners.”).
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“Before a
lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm to provide or assist
in the provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtain informed consent
from the client and must reasonably believe that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the
competent and ethical representation of the client. See also Rules 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4
(communication with client), 1.5(e) (fee sharing), 1.6 (confidentiality), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized
practice of law). The reasonableness of the decision to retain or contract with other lawyers
outside the lawyer’s own firm will depend upon the circumstances, including the education,
experience and reputation of the nonfirm lawyers; the nature of the services assigned to the
nonfirm lawyers; and the legal protections, professional conduct rules, and ethical environments
of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly relating to confidential
information.”).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”).
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timely but also exhibit an appropriate zealousness, and “devote the resources
needed to complete the job.”212
Not surprisingly, given that tax is a specialization of a small number of
lawyers, the Model Rules do not explicitly address the role of tax planners.
In the past, the ABA has issued formal opinions on the duties of tax lawyers
when advising as to return positions.213 However, the last such opinion was
issued in 1985 and substantial changes to the penalty regimes over the past
three decades have not prompted a revision.214 Accordingly, as a practical
matter, tax lawyers are guided by the I.R.C. return preparer regime and
Circular 230 rather than the Model Rules when providing return position or
planning advice.215
5.

Professional Association Standards: The AICPA

Like the ABA, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) has issued a code of professional responsibility.216 However, unlike
the ABA, the AICPA has authority to discipline its members, which it usually
does in conjunction with relevant state accountancy boards.217
212. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 204, at § 1-3.1; see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1, 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on
behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.
A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal
in advocacy upon the client's behalf. . . . [3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely
resented than procrastination.”).
213. See generally Hatfield, supra note 100, at 683–98, for the history of ABA Formal
Opinions 314 and 85–352.
214. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85–352 (1985)
(requiring positions on a return to have a realistic possibility of success on the merits). This
position is understood to be greater than the reasonable basis standard but lesser than the
substantial authority standard applied by 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2018) and 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2014).
GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 154–55.
215. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 155.
216. Id.
217. The only states in which enforcement is not joint are Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa,
and New Mexico. AICPA/State Board of Accountancy Cooperative Enforcement available at
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/professionalethics/resources/ethicsenforc
ement/downloadabledocuments/aicpa-state-board-cooperative-enforcement.pdf [https://perma.
cc/JEV7-GTCZ]. See generally, AICPA JOINT ETHICS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, 2019) (Joint Ethics Enforcement Program § 1.8 “The purpose of
the JEEP [(Joint Ethics Enforcement Program)] agreement between the AICPA and a state
society is to permit a single investigation of a joint member to enforce the respective codes and,
if warranted, have a single settlement agreement or joint trial board hearing. JEEP also permits
state societies to allow the AICPA to investigate state society members who are not also AICPA
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CPAs are obligated to provide “due care” for their clients.218 This
obligation requires both competence and due diligence.219 However, unlike
the model rules for lawyers, the AICPA provides specific guidance for return
preparation and tax advice. With respect to return preparation, a CPA is to
comply with the reporting and disclosure standards of the applicable taxing
authority, which would be the I.R.C. penalty regime and Circular 230 when
preparing a federal income tax return.220 As to tax advice that is not return
preparation, the CPA is supposed to ensure that the advice “reflects
competence and serves the taxpayer’s needs” and complies with the
requirements of the taxing authority.221 The CPA is told to assume that tax
advice will affect how the return is prepared, so the return preparation
standards should be considered.222 The AICPA guides CPAs in their use of
other professionals’ opinions when giving tax advice: consider the
knowledge and expertise of other professionals, as well as the relevance and
members.”) available at https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/professional
ethics/resources/ethicsenforcement/downloadabledocuments/jeepmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JTF6-CYMC].
218. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 0.300.060 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, 2014) (“Due Care. 01 Due care principle. A member should observe the
profession’s technical and ethical standards, strive continually to improve competence and the
quality of services, and discharge professional responsibility to the best of the member’s ability.
02 The quest for excellence is the essence of due care. Due care requires a member to discharge
professional responsibilities with competence and diligence. It imposes the obligation to perform
professional services to the best of a member’s ability, with concern for the best interest of those
for whom the services are performed, and consistent with the profession’s responsibility to the
public.”).
219. Id.
220. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX
SERVICES (SSTS), NO. 1, Tax Return Positions: STATEMENT 4 (2019) (“A member should
determine and comply with the standards, if any, that are imposed by the applicable taxing
authority with respect to recommending a tax return position, or preparing or signing a tax
return.”).
221. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX
SERVICES (SSTS), NO. 7, Form and Content of Advice to Taxpayers: STATEMENT 2 (2019) (“A
member should use professional judgment to ensure that tax advice provided to a taxpayer reflects
competence and appropriately serves the taxpayer’s needs. When communicating tax advice to a
taxpayer in writing, a member should comply with relevant taxing authorities’ standards, if any,
applicable to written tax advice. A member should use professional judgment about any need to
document oral advice. A member is not required to follow a standard format when communicating
or documenting oral advice.”).
222. Id. at 3 (“A member should assume that tax advice provided to a taxpayer will affect the
manner in which the matters or transactions considered would be reported or disclosed on the
taxpayer’s tax returns. Therefore, for tax advice given to a taxpayer, a member should consider,
when relevant (a) return reporting and disclosure standards applicable to the related tax return
position and (b) the potential penalty consequences of the return position. In ascertaining
applicable return reporting and disclosure standards, a member should follow the standards in
Statement on Standards for Tax Services No. 1, Tax Return Positions.”).
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persuasiveness of the opinion, assessing whether the conclusion of the
opinion is supported by the authorities.223
6.

Malpractice Standards

When a tax professional fails to fulfill an appropriate standard, the
consequences may include not only discipline by the relevant authority but,
if the client is injured, a potential malpractice suit.224 As a practical matter, in
tax malpractice suits, CPAs and tax lawyers are held to the same standard.225
The standard is the level of care normally exercised by professionals in
similar circumstances.226 Even though the rules of professional associations
are drafted for professional discipline, courts may consider them in
malpractice litigation initiated by aggrieved (former) clients.227 In litigation,
whether or not the tax professional met the standard will be determined by
experts testifying as to what competent professionals in similar circumstances
would have done.228
C. The Professional Standard for Using AI in Tax Planning
Having surveyed the professional standards for tax planning, we can turn
again to considering how AI for tax planning might function in the future.
Being fed as many facts as available on the client’s situation, and perhaps
itself continuously gathering those facts in real time, AI would detect patterns
that are legally relevant and patterns that provide planning opportunities,
even though those patterns may not have been spotted by the professional.229
223. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 220 at 6 (“A member should
determine and comply with the standards, if any, that are imposed by the applicable taxing
authority with respect to recommending a tax return position, or preparing or signing a tax
return.”).
224. While civil actions for tax malpractice may be based in either tort or contract, the two
standards are practically the same. See Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A
Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 708 (2008) (exploring
the elements and the proper measure of damages in tax malpractice litigation).
.
225. “While there might be some theoretical benefit in attempting to analyze the professions
separately, the pragmatic truth is that the dividing line between the professions with respect to tax
work has never been clear.” Id. at 707.
226. Id. at 709.
227. Some courts have held that the ethics rules define professional duties as a matter of law,
though a violation of those rules does not give rise to a cause of action in and of itself.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(2) cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
228. DAMIAN D. CAPOZZOLA, EXPERT WITNESSES IN CIVIL TRIALS: EFFECTIVE PREPARATION
AND PRESENTATION § 2:36 (2018).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 136–40.
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AI would similarly sort through the legal authorities and planning
commentaries to determine relevance and opportunities, and relate the laws
and facts, estimating and generating and predicting facts when need be, to
devise a tax minimization plan.230 As part of the process, AI would be able to
determine the probability of success if litigated, as, indeed, even the earliest
generation of tax research AI does this.231 The result would be delivered to
the tax professional along with a conclusion that it has no more than a
reasonable basis (and should be disclosed) or as much as substantial authority
or even that it is reasonable to believe the plan is more likely than not to
succeed.232 Ideally, the AI would also determine if the plan has economic
substance.233
We concluded earlier that considering when it is professionally
appropriate for tax professionals to rely upon another professional’s advice
would be revealing for determining how they should use AI in tax planning.234
In reviewing the professional obligations of CPAs and tax lawyers, we read
that standards for competence and diligence, as well as the I.R.C. taxpayer
and return preparer penalty regimes, acknowledge the propriety of relying on
the advice or opinions of others.235 Tax return preparers may rely on the
advice of other professionals and escape penalties even when the incorrect
positions they advised lacked so much as a reasonable basis.236 Circular 230’s
standards for competence and diligence both consider it appropriate to use
others: competence can involve consulting with other professionals, and
diligence can involve relying on the work of others.237 The first rule of ethics
for lawyers, competence, may require the lawyer to involve the services of
another lawyer.238 As for CPAs, it is presumed they may work with other
professionals in advising clients.239
In sum, the tax professional is permitted to rely on the advice of another
when doing so would be reasonable and good faith. But what does that mean?
First, it means that the professional has no reason to doubt the adequacy of
the advice.240 The advice does not appear unreasonable on its face; it
considers the relevant facts and law; and the professional has no reason to
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See supra text accompanying notes 136–40.
See supra text accompanying notes 122–24; see also Sorenson, supra note 88.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–44.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–44.
See supra Part IV (A).
See supra text accompanying notes 206–09 and note 223.
See supra text accompanying notes 206–09 and note 223.
See supra text accompanying notes 198–201.
See supra text accompanying notes 206–09.
See supra text accompanying note 223.
See supra text accompanying note 223.
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consider it unreliable.241 Second, it means that the source of the advice is
reasonably believed to be qualified and competent.242 This can be due to the
professional’s care in engaging the person, or in assessing the person’s
education, experience, and reputation.243
Note why it is that a professional would be in the position of relying on
another. First, it could be that the other professional is a member of the
client’s team. For example, a client’s CPA and lawyer work together simply
because the client has chosen each of them. Two other illustrations however
are more apropos. A professional might engage another out of the duty of
diligence. Due to workload or deadline pressure, for example, one lawyer
may need another lawyer’s help. Or one might engage another out of the duty
of competence. A competent professional knows his or her own limits of
competence and qualification and knows when it is necessary to consult
someone with greater expertise.
The requirements for tax professionals using AI in tax planning should be
articulated to reflect these standards. It is in the same situations that a CPA
or tax lawyer would want to rely on AI: either out of need to be diligent or a
lack of expertise. Just as with human experts, the tax professional should be
able to rely on the AI even when he or she is unable to deliver as expert an
opinion, or unable to do so without devoting a great deal more time which he
or she may not have or for which the client may not be willing to pay.
Just as with the rules for relying on the advice of another human
professional, the tax professional should believe the AI to be reliable,
generally, and the professional should have no reason to believe the AI’s
work on a specific plan is unreasonable. But there are two practical
difficulties. One is knowing that an AI application is reliable. If a tax
professional is supposed to consider the education, experience, and reputation
of a human professional before relying on his or her advice, what is analogous
to consider for a computer program? This problem will be especially difficult
for the early generations of AI adopters, and remain difficult as AI
applications proliferate insofar as there most always will be a new application
and one that may promise benefits unavailable with others and especially
suited for the client’s needs.
241. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6694-1(e)(1), -2(e); 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(b); SSTS INTERPRETATION NO.
1–2, supra note 223.
242. SSTS INTERPRETATION NO. 1–2, supra note 223.
243. 31 C.F.R. § 10.22; AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 220; AM.
INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX SERVICES (SSTS),
NO. 2, Answers to Questions on Returns 8 (2019); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt.
6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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The second practical problem is knowing whether the AI-generated plan
is unreasonable. This problem is one of degree, varying to the extent the AI’s
expertise surpasses the professional. The professional may be unable to
second-guess the AI. Of course, when relying on another human expert’s
opinion, the professional may also be unable to second-guess it. That may be,
after all, exactly why the second professional is being used—to provide a
valuation or other specific expertise, for example. However, the tax
professional is able to ask questions of the other professional, questions that
reflect the professional’s education and experience as well as uncertainty;
indeed, it is expected that the two professionals will discuss the opinion due
to their having the same client objectives and familiarity with the facts but
different professional perspectives. However, a CPA or lawyer using AI to
generate a tax plan will not have the opportunity for that type of human
dialogue, which is really an opportunity to have one’s questions answered
and to learn from the greater expert and, indirectly, thereby improve one’s
own competence. And if the professional is unable to do that, then he will be
unable to adequately advise clients on the potential risks and rewards of the
plan, having substituted artificial intelligence for his own. And, unlike, for
example, when the lawyer can arrange for the valuation expert to discuss the
opinion directly with the client, the tax professional presumably will not be
sending the client directly to the computer for a better explanation.
V.

PROPOSAL FOR RESPONSIBLE USE OF AI IN TAX PLANNING
A. Three Problems

While the professional standards for using AI should be those for using
another expert, the practical problems differ. One problem is the need to
assess the reliability of the AI application, generally. The reasonableness
standard for professionals refers to the practices of reasonable professionals:
a competent and diligent professional is one that complies with the
professional customs of competence and diligence.244 This is not problematic
so long as there are, in fact, established customs. However, pioneers are
always at risk. The early adopters of AI applications will be unable to comply
with professional norms for determining the reliability of an applications as
there will have been no widespread experience with those applications, much
less customs for sorting the reliable from the unreliable. And individual
professionals will never be in the position to sort all available applications.
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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Individual professionals have limited time and energy and opportunities for
doing so. The fundamental issue is how a duly cautious, self-regulating
profession grows, adapting to new tools by articulating appropriate standards.
A second problem is the need to assess the reasonableness of the specific
AI-generated plan. To the extent the AI’s expertise exceeds the
professional’s, the professional simply may be unable to spot weaknesses in
the plan. If the professional is unable to do this, then he or she will be unable
to accurately convey the potential risks and rewards to the client, which
means the client will either forego near certain tax benefits or plunge itself
forward with near certain tax penalties. When a tax professional considers the
opinion of another human expert, the two discuss the opinion and its bases
and the tax professional can ask and answer questions and, indeed, learn and
be better able to advise the client.
Thus, in order to use AI in a professionally responsible way, the tax
professional needs three things. First: a means by which to determine the
general quality and reliability of the AI application. Second is a means by
which to identify weaknesses in the AI-generated plan when the plan extends
beyond the professional’s current expertise. Third is a means by which to
extend the professional’s understanding on the matters raised by the plan. The
second and third problems need to be resolved so that the tax professional
can appropriately advise the client, though, the resolution of these problems
also benefit the tax professional by improving his or her own professional
competence.
B. Who Should Solve?
Who should solve these three problems? Insofar as individual
professionals are unable to do so, it is reasonable to consider the professional
associations. Indeed, the professions are premised upon a substantial degree
of self-regulation. The professions have an interest and a defining right to
articulate their own standards of professional responsibility.
But there are practical difficulties with the professional associations
solving these problems. While both the ABA and the AICPA have produced
comprehensive codes of professional conduct, neither is in the position to test
AI tax planning programs and provide guidance on their appropriate use. For
lawyers, tax is a relatively small specialization. And it is one in which the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
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shown little interest or understanding.245 This is the committee charged with
issuing opinions to guide lawyers, and the committee that has not even
updated its guidance on return preparation to reflect decades of changes in
the laws.246 It is a committee whose previous applications of professional
responsibility standards to tax lawyers have ignored the nature of tax practice
and the suggestions of tax lawyers on what those standards should be.247 Even
if the committee were to develop the capacity, inclination, and specialized
expertise, the need to sort AI applications as they become available is not the
type of work that the committee does.248 The committee issues formal
opinions deduced from general principles; it does not opine very specifically,
much less as specifically as would be useful for lawyers considering which
AI applications to buy.249 While the tax committee may have both the
inclination and expertise for this work, it does not have the capacity to
undertake testing programs. It also lacks the authorization to issue formal
ethics opinions. However, regardless of the committee jurisdiction, capacity,
inclination, and expertise, the ABA as such has no disciplinary authority.
While the ABA can articulate potentially persuasive professionalism
positions, it is the IRS and state bars that regulate tax lawyers.250 And, at the
state bar level, there are the same problems of limited interest in tax
specialization and a greater lack of capacity to undertake the work, not to
mention the risk that the dozens of state bars could adopt dozens of
approaches.
245. See ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 314 and 85–352
(1985), for a discussion of the tensions between the ABA professional responsibility committee
and tax sections on issues related to the ethics of tax lawyering. See also Hatfield, supra note100,
at 683–699.
246. The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is the committee
authorized to issue ethics opinions interpreting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These
are called the “ABA Formal Opinions.” The last Formal Opinion for tax lawyers was 85–352.
The Committee has since left tax lawyers without practical guidance. GALLER & LANG, supra
note 4, at 155.
247. See GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 155.
248. See Id. at 7–8.
249. With respect to emerging technologies, the ABA has been circumspect. In 2012, it
modified Comment 8 of Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules (competence). The modification said that
lawyers should stay abreast of changes in technology. In 2017, ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 477R (2017) was issued: lawyers should use (unspecified but)
reasonable efforts to secure communications about client matters. In 2018, ABA Comm. on Ethics
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 477R (2018) was issued to advise lawyers they have duties
to current clients in the event of a data breach (though the opinion took no position on the ethical
duties of lawyers to former clients and non-clients). While there is some function to these types
of opinions, the louder message is that (for, perhaps, very good reasons) the ABA is not going to
commit itself to providing specific and practical advice.
250. GALLER & LANG, supra note 4, at 7–8.
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The AICPA and the state accountancy boards, on the other hand, do have
considerable interest and expertise in tax services provided by their CPAs.
And, unlike the ABA, the AICPA does have disciplinary authority over its
members.251 But, like the ABA, the AICPA has done a thorough job of
producing a code of professional conduct but has never taken on the job of
opining as to the grade of specific commercial products available for
professionals to use, which is what CPAs would need to guide their AI
purchases to ensure that their use would be professionally reasonable.
The AICPA and the state accountancy boards also suffer from the same
obvious limit of the ABA and state bars: none cover the scope of federal tax
professionals. While both CPAs and lawyers may engage in advising on
federal tax matters, it is only the IRS that regulates both. From the federal
regulatory perspective, CPAs and tax lawyers comprise a single tax
profession. The I.R.C. penalty provisions and Circular 230 make no
distinction between CPAs and lawyers, and they apply the same standards
and authorize the same penalties for failing to meet the standards.252 While
the ABA professional committee’s indifference to these standards and
penalties reflects its indifference to the peculiarities of tax practice, the
AICPA acknowledges the authority of the IRS as federal taxing authority,
requiring its members to adhere to the federal professional standards.253
Though the IRS has the relevant legal authority to regulate the use of AI
by tax professionals, there are significant obstacles. First is that it has an
extraordinary range of tasks and extraordinarily limited resources.254 But even
if it were granted sufficient resources for this particular task, its undertaking
would be unavoidably and understandably controversial. It is undeniable that
the IRS has the authority to regulate tax professionals, but it is undeniably
problematic: the professionals responsible for arranging their clients’ affairs
so as to pay the least tax are regulated by the agency responsible for collecting
those taxes. After all, think of the criminal defense bar’s use of AI for defense
planning being subject to the local police and prosecutors approving the
particular AI program. The potential for AI to be extraordinarily good at
251. Id. at 8.
252. Circular 230 makes no distinction between professions. It uses the term “practitioner.”
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, .34–.35, .37 (2018).
253. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 220.
254. On the current budget woes of the IRS, see, for example, Emily Horton, 2018 Funding
Bill Falls Short for the IRS, CENTER ON BUDGET POLICY AND PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/2018-funding-bill-falls-short-for-the-irs
[https://perma.cc/A5GA-8HGK]. See also Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making
the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725, 759–72 (2015), which describes
suggestions to improve IRS performance in a time of deeper and seemingly never-ending budget
cuts.
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implementing the taxpayer’s right to contribute no more than necessary
makes the regulation of AI by the agency authorized to compel those
contributions inherently suspect. While tax advising and return preparation
are not considered adversarial acts, the two may put the client on the course
to controversy and litigation with the IRS, which is adversarial.255 This is a
long discussed professional regulation problem in the tax field and not unique
to the AI context.256
C. The Proposal
1.

The Solution

The solution to these problems could be delivered through a public-private
professional certification regime.257 Tax planning AI developers would
submit their applications to one or more privately organized panels that, for
a fee, would test the application for reliability. These panels would be
comprised of CPAs and tax lawyers. This would acknowledge the customary
right of professionals to articulate professional norms, as well as the need of
actual experts to determine if the products are, in fact, reliable. The panels
would provide the AI with simulated problems and then assess its
performance. Just as in malpractice cases where experts opine on what the
established professional standards require in the instance case, the panel
professionals would ultimately opine on whether the AI application is
reliable. By investing significant time, running multiple scenarios, debating
the results with one another, and consulting with computer and other experts,
as necessary, the panel could accomplish what individual professionals never
could, especially given that these panels would test multiple AI products over
time. The panel reviews would feed back into the AI developers’ works,
thereby increasing the quality of products as they are being developed.

255. Of course, as described in ABA Formal Opinion 85–352, the return may be the first step
in a relation that becomes adversarial. ABA Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility,
supra note 214.
256. As the Treasury Department increased its regulation of tax professionals in the 1980s,
the New York State Bar Association Tax Section claimed the conflict-of-interest was unjustifiable
and undermined the fundamental American right to adversarial challenges to the government. Tax
Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Circular 230 and the Standards Applicable to Tax Shelter
Opinions, 12 TAX NOTES 251, 261 (Feb. 9, 1981). Others agreed. Hatfield, supra note 100, at
710–11.
257. The need for AI software used in court to be validated has been discussed. See Karnow,
supra note 3, at 177.
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The panels can be envisioned to function somewhat as Underwriter’s
Laboratory has with respect to fire safety and the Orthodox Union has with
kosher food in the U.S.258 The demand for fire safety certification was fueled
by insurance companies, local governments, the construction industry, and
manufacturers.259 The result was the development of the Underwriter’s
Laboratory to test products for fire safety.260 The demand for packaged foods
in the 1950s translated into demands by religiously observant Jewish
households for kosher certification agencies.261 The Orthodox Union
provided rabbis to inspect industrial processing and packaging of foods and
certify compliant products as kosher.262 Both the Underwriter’s Laboratory
and the Orthodox Union were funded by fees paid by the manufacturers, and
those fees covered the costs of developing, implementing, and enforcing
regulations in situations in which the government was less equipped.263
The manufacturers were willing to pay the fees only because there was a
product demand for the certification. Product demand is essential for private
certification to be funded and, thus, to succeed.264 The IRS would stimulate
product demand for certification by providing a penalty defense for those
258. William Merrill founded the Underwriters Lab (UL) after an initial study of building
materials and electrical appliances funded by the National Board of Fire Underwriters in the wake
of a series of fires throughout American cities. Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive Third-Party
Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints that Frustrate Government
Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 539, 543 (2014). The results of the study were put forth in
an “approved fittings and electrical devices” list and distributed to fire underwriters and municipal
fire service officers. Id. at 544. The UL was founded shortly thereafter in 1901. Id. By 1916, it
was financially independent and deriving income from companies paying for the testing to be
done. Id. Eventually, insurance companies were conditioning policies on using UL approved
materials and municipalities used UL standards in developing building codes. Id. at 544–45. In
order to ensure continuing success, Merrill insisted on hiring the best experts and focusing on
professionalism. Id. at 545. By employing a mix of people from insurance, government, and
industry, the UL ensured that standards remained high. Id. In order to respond to competition and
assuage any fears about the testing process, the UL took steps to be transparent by sharing
complete reports with industry clients, producing lists of approved products, and allowing the
public to visit their facilities. Id. at 547. On top of all of the organizational safeguards, Merrill
also incubated a strong sense of mission that many employees and customers bought into. Id. at
546. Today, over 22,000,000,000 products carry the UL logo. Id. at 548.
The Orthodox Union (OU) turned the Kosher certification process into a highly organized
operation from its roots as a part-time job for many rabbis. Id. at 550–51. To round out their
personnel, OU trains them in food chemistry, food technology, customer relations, and
professional ethics in addition to the necessary underlying Jewish dietary laws. Id. at 551. The
OU gained dominance in the field by employing a multi-tiered structure. Id. at 552.
259. Id. at 544–47.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 549.
262. Id. at 550–51.
263. See id. at 543–44, 549–50.
264. Id. at 540.
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professionals who used certified AI in good faith, though the resulting advice
proved deficient. Providing this protection to tax professionals who used
certified products would encourage both commercial AI developers and tax
professionals to value the certification. This protection would be assured by
the IRS for products that met the approval of the panel experts for substantive
reliability and also for product requirements, such as product features aimed
at aiding the tax professional in understanding the weaknesses and limits of
the AI-generated advice.
The integrity of the certification process would be guarded in two ways.
The first is qualifying for panel membership only those with demonstrated
substantial expertise and ethical propriety in their professional affairs. The
panelists would be professionals with an extraordinary understanding and
commitment to federal tax law, the self-reporting tax system, and the right
regulation of tax practice. Second is that this certification regime would be
overseen by the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which is
the IRS office on which Circular 230 confers exclusive responsibility for
disciplining practitioners (including financial penalties, suspension, and
disbarment).265 OPR investigates tax professionals when the IRS has assessed
tax return preparer penalties as well as in situations in which IRS employees
or others have provided information that justifies an investigation.266
Accordingly, OPR will be in the best position to identify problems with AI
being used as tax professionals, including detecting when AI certified by a
particular panel should not have been.
2.

Implementing the Solution

This proposal would be implemented by the Treasury Department through
regulations under 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (return preparer regulations) and
modifications to the Circular 230 regulations. As part of the process of
issuing regulations, the Treasury Department, like all federal agencies,
provides notice and receives comments.267 Through the notice and comment
process, the ABA, AICPA, and state bars and accountancy boards would be
encouraged to articulate concerns and provide suggestions so that the
resulting penalty protection would be acceptable to professional disciplinary

265. 31 C.F.R. § 10.1(a)(1) (2018) (authorizing OPR); 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (2018) (sanctions
available to OPR).
266. On referrals to OPR, see Bryan E. Gates, IRM Abr.& Ann. § 4.11.55.5.1 (May 29, 2018).
267. For an explanation of this process for federal agencies, see LEE MODJESKA,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4:3 (2018).
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authorities.268 Ideally, a panel certification sufficient to protect tax
professionals from IRS-imposed penalties would also protect them from
sanctions by professional associations. The notice and comment process
would be the opportunity for the professional associations and the federal
government to cooperate. It also would be an opportunity for the ABA and
other lawyers to provide suggestions to the Treasury Department that would
make panel certification more likely to be relevant in professional
malpractice litigation as well. A coordinated effort of these interested parties
should stimulate product demand for the certification.
In broad outline, what would these Treasury Regulations require? These
Regulations would modify the I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) reasonable cause and good
faith exception to the return preparer penalties for understating tax liability.269
This would expand Treasury Regulation § 1.6694-2(e).270 The modifications
would provide that a return preparer’s good faith reliance on a certified AI
application would be deemed reasonable. The return preparer would bear the
burden of establishing the good faith use but would not bear the burden of
establishing the quality of the AI. Similar modifications protecting any tax
professional from using AI in his or her practice before the IRS, specifically
including providing written advice on federal tax matters, would need to be
made to Circular 230. These modifications would expand the reliance-onothers provisions found in 31 C.F.R. § 10.22, which is the diligence
obligation applicable to all aspects of practice before the IRS; 31 C.F.R. §
10.35, which sets forth standards for all returns, documents, and other papers;
and 31 C.F.R. § 10.37, which sets forth the requirements for written advice.271
These new Treasury Regulations would create a registry of certified AI
applications. OPR would establish an advisory committee of authorized
practitioners under Circular 230 § 10.38, which authorizes OPR to establish
advisory committees.272 This committee would function as the liaison
between the certification panels and OPR, and also, as necessary, the ABA,
the AICPA, other relevant professional associations, and the AI developers.
This committee would monitor the certification activities of the panels and
also the disciplinary proceedings against tax professionals who used AI
certified products, making recommendations to improve the processes.
The Treasury Regulations would establish the guidelines for the
composition of panels. Panel members would be required to have certain
268. Of course, the professional associations might also modify their codes of conduct or
issue guidance to reflect the use of AI.
269. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(3) (2015).
270. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-2(e) (2009).
271. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, .35, .37 (2018).
272. Id. § 10.38.
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credentials, substantial experience, and an excellent reputation among other
professionals and OPR. The panel members should meet the requirements to
be experts in malpractice litigation in the jurisdictions in which they practice.
Panels should have expertise in tax planning, compliance, audit, and
litigation. The panels should have as consultants qualified appraisers,
enrolled actuaries, and others commonly involved in tax practice, as well as
computer scientists. Panels should include a mix of professionals with private
tax experience and experience working within the IRS. The panels should
reflect a geographical mix of experts, as well as experts from local, regional,
and national firms.
The Treasury Regulations would authorize the panels to charge fees for
testing any computer program that is marketed on the basis of its ability to
generate tax minimization plans customized to specific facts.273 Each panel
would have wide discretion in determining the best way to test these
programs, though the opinion of each panel member would need to be
recorded and available to OPR.274 No panel would be permitted to certify an
AI program unless a super-majority of its members voted to do so. Ideally,
any dissent would be taken quite seriously with the aim of arriving at a
consensus through further testing, review, and discussion.
While the panels would have considerable operational discretion,
certification would require a positive vote on five specific functions. The first
would be substantive accuracy.275 For example, an AI program might
generate a plan for a shareholder-employee of an S corporation to receive a
certain dollar amount characterized as compensation and a certain dollar
amount as a non-taxable dividend.276 The strategy of the plan would be to
minimize total tax liability but without penalty risk. The AI program might
conclude the plan is more likely than not to succeed.277 Each panel member
would then vote on whether he or she would consider the advice appropriate
and whether it would be reasonable to believe it to be more likely than not to
succeed.
273. This approach avoids the need to define AI. This approach is premised on the AI
developer’s marketing claims. This approach may include products that may not usually be
considered AI. However, any over-inclusiveness would not be problematic as the products would
still be within the expertise of the panels, and it would allow product demand to develop for
certifying less dazzling as well as more dazzling products. Defining AI is difficult and, in this
situation, unnecessary. On the difficulty of defining AI, see supra notes 16–17 and accompanying
text.
274. If an AI application became involved in serious disciplinary cases prosecuted by the
OPR, the identities of the particular panel members who voted to certify the application could
become useful for disqualifying those individuals from panel membership.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 230–32.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 149–50.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 182–83.
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The second requirement is that the AI programs provide more than a bare
conclusion. It would need to identify the facts it determined to be relevant
and provide an assessment of how important certain facts are to its analysis.278
For example, perhaps a very low compensation level to the shareholderemployee was justified in large part because of the low educational
credentials of the shareholder-employee.279 The critical nature of those facts
to the tax plan would be highlighted and appropriately visualized.280 This
would improve the professional’s understanding of the AI program and the
plan and allow the professional to double-check important facts and have
important conversations with the client.281 It may be, for example, that the
278. Depending upon the design of the AI, this and related functions may be difficult to
achieve. Some very powerful AI designs achieve remarkable results but are unable to effectively
communicate to users how those results are achieved. The operations are within a black box.
Efforts to make the processes more transparent may reduce the achievements. See Calo, supra
note 15, at 415; Karnow, supra note 3, at 142; Katz, supra note 23, at 918; Knight, supra note 3.
279. See supra note 145.
280. When data is visualized, it can have a large effect on our interpretation and even our
mood. Something as simple as what type is used can have an impact on the ability to comprehend
and engage with the words being written. KEVIN LARSON ET AL., PEOPLE AND COMPUTERS XX—
ENGAGE: MEASURING THE AESTHETICS OF READING 41, 49 (Nick Bryan-Kinns et al. eds., 2007).
Data visualization has the ability to speed up the process by which our brains comprehend data in
part because we can perceive patterns in a graph or series of graphs better than my looking at the
data by which the graphs are drawn from. How Data Visualization Helps Your Brain Absorb
Information, MTAB (last visited Oct.. 15, 2019), https://www.mtab.com/data-visualization-helpsbrain-absorb-information/ [https://perma.cc/Z633-UMMS]. Graphs and pie charts are great tools
for visualizing data in a format easy to grasp when looking at data sets. However, in the age of
Blue-J and that program’s ability to render, and visualize, a prediction by pumping out a simple
percentage, it is important to understand how the data visualization used can affect user decisions.
For example, in a Yale School of Management study looked at perceptions and choices based on
the visualization of data on restaurant reviews. Even where the mean distribution was lower,
participants favored a restaurant whose distribution of 1–5 star ratings was top heavy over a
restaurant with a higher mean score but heavy lower distribution. Visually speaking, the top heavy
distribution appealed to users despite the lower overall average of the score. Matthew Fisher,
George E. Newman & Ravi Dhar, Seeing Stars: How the Binary Bias Distorts the Interpretation
of Customer Ratings, 45 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 471, 474 (2018). When they were given only the
average score and not a visualization of the underlying data, they chose the one with the higher
mean. Id. at 479. Thus, a feature like TurboTax’s display of your current refund could ostensibly
inform one’s decision on how to answer questions in order to attain the maximum refund as
opposed to the most accurate return.
281. Data visualization can help increase user confidence in decision making, but whether
that confidence actually coincides with accuracy is a separate question. Data suggests that
visualization alone, while increasing confidence, can actually undermine accuracy of decision
making while visualization combined with the ability to interact with the data can lead to an
increase of accuracy as well as confidence in the financial context. Fengchun Tang et al., The
Effects of Visualization and Interactivity on Calibration in Financial Decision-Making, AMCIS
2011 PROC.—ALL SUBMISSIONS (2011). Confidence is easier to manipulate than accuracy
meaning that while certain factors may increase a person’s confidence in decision-making, their
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low credentials should have been offset by many years of experience. Panel
members would have to determine the adequacy of this part of the AI
program’s function.
A third requirement would be that the AI program communicate its
uncertainty.282 For example, an AI program might generate a novel corporate
tax minimization plan but alongside it would report the degrees of uncertainty
on the substantive issues. It would need to highlight any estimations or
predictions it generated and relied upon, as well as its reliance on legal issues
for which there is a split among circuits, or disagreement among expert
commentators, or non-acquiescence by the IRS, or other indicia of
uncertainty.283 The AI program would need to highlight the weaknesses of its
analysis so that the professional notices the weaknesses and is better able to
advise the client.
A fourth requirement would be that the AI program engage the
professional. The ideal AI would not function so much as an oracle but as a
colleague that engages in conversation and argument both learning from and
teaching the professional.284 The idea that conversation with a computer
could be equivalent with that of a human has long animated the pursuit of
AI.285 But, at the least, the AI should include some function to test the
professional’s understanding of what the AI has suggested. For example, if
the program has indicated some uncertainty on a substantive issue, does the
professional understand what that means to the overall plan? By forcing the
professional to demonstrate his or her own understanding of certain important
accuracy in doing so may remain consistent or even fall even when aided by a computer. Id.;
Jeffrey E. Kottemann, Fred E. Davis & William E. Remus, Computer-Assisted Decision Making:
Performance, Beliefs, and the Illusion of Control, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 26, 32–33 (1994). In a study which used XBRL (eXtensible Business
Reporting Language) to measure the effects of visualization and interaction, it was found that
either factor alone did not increase accuracy but when combined they did. See Fengchun Tang et
al., supra note 281 at 5–8. This suggests that in designing a program, the user should be given
visual representations of the data underlying the output but also the ability to interact with the
various pieces used to produce the output in order to better develop accuracy. Perhaps the ability
to see results while choosing pieces to ignore could be a good solution to increase understanding
on the user’s part and help them better identify things which will increase accuracy in the long
run. A level of confidence given by the program is simply not a substitute for the user being able
to dive into key points to understand where the reasoning came from.
282. Knight, supra note 3.
283. For a discussion of tax law research and the meaning of non-acquiescence, see
GIBBERMAN & JOVER-LEDESMA, supra note 134, at Chapter 2.
284. AI systems may be designed to benefit from interaction with human experts. See
Karnow, supra note 3, at 174; Rostain, supra note 33, at 562.
285. Philip Ball, The Truth About the Turing Test, BBC (July 24, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150724-the-problem-with-the-turing-test
[https://perma.cc/TY43-EJQE].
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parts of the plan, if not being technologically enabled to converse with the
professional about the plan, the program would provide one of the important
benefits of consulting with human experts: increasing the professional’s own
expertise and ability to assess and counsel clients on potential risks and
rewards.
Fifth, the AI program would need to maintain records of its use so that the
tax professional could establish good faith use in the event of a penalty
allegation. Under the Treasury Regulations, the program itself would be
deemed reliable by its certification but the professional would bear the burden
of proving good faith use.286 Thus, the need for the AI program to maintain
records that would enable the professional to prove such use. The program
would record the facts delivered to it. It would record what the AI provided
the professional, such as the plan, the facts critical to the plan, and the
uncertainties of the plan.287 It also would record its interactions with the
professional, including the degree to which the professional demonstrated his
or her understanding of the plan.288 The panel would assess the adequacy of
the program on these points, as well as how easy it would be for the
professional to access those records, and how the records would be stored.289
3.

Solving the Three Problems

The solution discourages the development of AI that provides bare
conclusions. It encourages AI that explains itself and engages with the
professional with the aim of improving her understanding and increasing her
expertise and competence. It should improve not only the professional’s
understanding of the legal and practical issues but the professional’s ability
to counsel the client.
The panels of professionals would do what no isolated professional could
do, which is determine the reliability of AI across many scenarios. No single
individual will have the time, resources, or incentives to test an AI application
this way before using it for a particular client. Involving high quality
professionals in scrutinizing an AI product is the most likely way to
determine if, as a matter of fact, the AI works as it should. It need not be
286. See supra text accompanying notes 184–86.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 278–83.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 284–85.
289. The storage of the records (e.g., in the cloud) is a practical and technological issue but
also raises professional responsibility issues if third parties have access to confidential
information. See, for example, Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 2215 (2012), which describes the
lawyer’s duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that confidential information stored in the cloud
remains confidential.
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infallible, but only a product that a reasonable, competent, diligent
professional would use.
The panels of professionals would keep professionalism as the touchstone
for their assessments. But the panels need the IRS to create the demand for
their work. The ongoing IRS oversight of professionals who use AI should
protect the process. But the most important protection would be the work of
those experts who understand the complexities of law and contemporary
practices and have a commitment to high standards. The panels will function
the best to the extent the panelists function like Orthodox Union rabbis whose
understanding of their law and the complexities of modern food practices is
joined with such a high commitment that it is not only professional but
personal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Tax law provides a good case study for encouraging professionally
responsible AI use. Tax professionals are responsible for divining the line
between the government’s right to take and the client’s right to keep, giving
due care not to err. It is a profession with a long history of computerization
and potential for much more. It is a profession comprised of professionals
united by a shared expertise and regulator. The technical guidance of its
shared regulator guides the AI discussion into practicalities and solutions
rather than the abstractions and distractions that mention of “artificial
intelligence” often spur.
Though the solution for tax professionals is technical and specifically for
them, it illuminates a way forward for other professions. It will be practical
for third parties (such as government or insurers) to stimulate product demand
for professionals to use certain types of AI. It will be useful to establish that
the use of certified AI will protect a professional from sanctions when the
advice fails. It may be most useful to aim that certification at protecting
professionals from the malpractice claims related to failed advice.
In general, these certifications should be provided to AI that augments,
that is, improves professional intelligence rather than functions as a bare
substitute for it. Encouraging the development of this type of AI, one that
functions to educate and develop the professional, increasing his or her
competence, is key. At some point, given the potential power of AI to
improve professional judgement, it may become a matter of malpractice for
a professional not to use it.
Also key is keeping professionals as the arbiters of what is professional.
What is professionally responsible is always an issue of the norms of the
profession. Burdening fellow professionals with the responsibility of
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certifying professionally appropriate AI creates a space for the professions to
remain self-regulating, even as they open themselves to the transformations
AI will bring.

